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ABSTRACT 
Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (TPP) and 
corresponding regulations specify that tobacco products be 
packaged in a particular size box and be made of certain 
material.2  No trademark other than the brand’s name may be 
printed, and font, letter size, color, and other packaging aspects 
are specified with particularity.3  These measures recently 
withstood a contentious dispute settlement request submitted 
on multiple grounds by four World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Member countries.4  What does the WTO’s Panel Report in this 
case tell us about the extent to which a country can take 
measures to advance its public health initiatives without 
violating obligations under Article 20 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)?  What 
is the legal test for deciding this?  To what extent can WTO 
Members undertake broad policy initiatives with the objective of 
protecting public health?  Could WTO Members carry out these 
initiatives even when the consequence is far-reaching 
diminishment of branding and economic value of other Members’ 
trademark rights?  Could the WTO Panel’s findings in this case 
embolden countries to take similar action with other consumer 
products medically proven to cause harm? 
 
 
                                                          
2  See generally Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) 
[hereinafter TPP Act 2011]; WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
May 21, 2003, 2301 U.N.T.S. 166, available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf (recognizing the 
health, social, economic and environmental consequences of tobacco 
consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke, WHO negotiated its first treaty 
in 2003 and garnered 168 Signatories); for clarity, I will use the abbreviation 
“TPP” to refer only to the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, and the term 
“TPP measures” to include both the Act and corresponding regulations, this 
phrasing is consistent with the WTO’s usage of these terms in Australia 
Trademark Panel Report.  
3  TPP Act 2011, supra note 2, ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 18. 
4  See generally Panel Report, Australia — Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS435/R; WT/DS441/R; WT/DS458/R; WT/DS467/R (adopted June 28, 
2018) [hereinafter Australia Trademarks Panel Report] (showing 
complainants are Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Indonesia, 
respectively). 
3
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This article examines and evaluates the arguments and 
analysis of one of the primary grounds used to challenge 
Australia’s plain packaging measures, Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Article 
20, which prohibits the unjustifiable encumbrance of 
trademarks used in the course of trade through the imposition 
of special requirements.5  After introducing the scope and 
context of tobacco-related health, economic, and societal issues 
worldwide, the article addresses Australia’s development and 
passage of the Tobacco Plain Packaging measures.  Next, Article 
20 and its elements are discussed.  As this was the first WTO 
case to decide the parameters of permissible trademark special 
requirements, the parties’ arguments and panel decision 
relating to Article 20 are summarized and analyzed.  The article 
then reviews the key WTO Panel report’s legal determinations 
and rationale, and then assesses whether similar trademark 
restrictions could be applied to other potentially dangerous 
products like alcohol and sugary, salty, or fatty foods without 
violating Article 20.  The conclusion considers legal and business 
implications of the WTO Panel’s analysis of complainants’ failed 
claim that Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging measures violate 
TRIPS Article 20. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A: Health and Social Effects of Tobacco Use 
Tobacco-related illnesses are some of the biggest public 
health threats in the history of the world6  According to the 
World Health Organization (WHO), approximately every six 
seconds, one person dies from a tobacco-caused disease.7  In 
2017, deaths relating to tobacco use had risen to about 7.2 
million people a year,8 and were forecasted to increase to more 
                                                          
5  Agreement on Trade Related Property Rights art. 20, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S.299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
6  News Release, World No Tobacco Day, 31 May 2016: Get ready for plain 
packaging, World Health Org. (May 31, 2016) (on file with World Health 
Organization) [hereinafter WHO World No Tobacco Day].  
7  Id.  
8  WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC: 
MONITORING TOBACCO USE AND PREVENTION POLICIES 17 (2017) [hereinafter 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/2
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than eight million people a year by 2030,9 exceeding HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria combined.10  On average, tobacco users 
lose 15 years of life.11 
 
Tobacco use is one of the largest preventable causes of 
noncommunicable diseases12 and is in fact “the only common risk 
factor across all four major non-communicable diseases 
(cardiovascular diseases, cancers, chronic respiratory diseases 
and diabetes).”13  Contributing to the death, disability and 
illness is the fact that, at least in recent years, “cigarettes and 
some other products containing tobacco are highly engineered so 
as to create and maintain dependence, and that many of the 
compounds they contain and the smoke they produce are . . . 
toxic, mutagenic and carcinogenic.”14  Smoking tobacco can 
cause many forms of cancer, including “lung, larynx, lip, tongue, 
mouth, pharynx, oesophagus, pancreas, bladder, kidney, cervix, 
stomach and acute myeloid leukaemia, liver cancer, and urinary 
tract cancer,”15 as well as “stroke, peripheral vascular disease, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, several serious 
cardiovascular diseases, many kinds of respiratory diseases and 
impairments and other types of disease.”16  Also, and 
importantly, the scope of medical issues relating to tobacco is not 
limited to smokers; significant harm can be caused to non-
smokers.  Approximately 1.2 million non-smokers die annually 
from illness related to second-hand smoke.17  Passive smoking 
“causes premature death and disease in children and in adults 
who do not smoke.”18  According to the WHO, “there is clear 
                                                          
WHO Report]. 
9 WHO World No Tobacco Day, supra note 6. 
10 WHO Report, supra note 8. 
11 World Health Org., Tobacco Threatens Us All 3 (2017) [hereinafter 
WHO Tobacco Threatens Us All]. 
12 WHO World No Tobacco Day, supra note 6. 
13 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2579. 
14 World Health Organization [WHO], Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, opened for signature June 16, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166 (entered into 
force Feb. 27, 2005) [hereinafter WHO FCTC]. 
15 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2578. 
16 Id.  
17 Indu B. Ahluwalia, et. al., Tobacco Use and Tobacco-Related Behaviors 
—11 Countries, 2008-2017, 68 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 928, 928 
(Oct.18, 2019). 
18 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2578. 
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scientific evidence that prenatal exposure to tobacco smoke 
causes adverse health and developmental conditions for 
children.”19  The evidence makes it clear why this is an urgent 
public health problem based on medical data alone. 
 
In addition to the human toll, tobacco “represents a major 
barrier to sustainable development that impacts health, poverty, 
global hunger, education, economic growth, gender equality, the 
environment, finance and governance.”20  Money from medical 
resource budgets is diverted from other pressing priorities.  
Money from household budgets is diverted from basic 
necessities.  The cost of smoking is estimated at $1.4 trillion, or 
1.8% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP),21 with 
corresponding annual global health care costs associated with 
smoking being approximately $422 billion.22  The remaining cost 
of about $1 trillion per year is indirect; for example, lost 
productivity due to illness and premature death.23  To put this 
in perspective, the annual cost of smoking globally is equal to 
about ten times the amount spent on aid worldwide, or nearly 
the GDP of Canada, the world’s tenth wealthiest country.24  This 
social and economic impact continues even when smoking rates 
decline because the disease and health effects caused by tobacco 
consumption can take years to manifest.25 
 
Tobacco usage contributes to poverty and impacts lower-
income countries which have fewer resources and less ability to 
control and combat the problem.  “The burden of death and 
diseases from non-communicable diseases is most heavily 
concentrated in the world’s poorest countries.”26  More than 80% 
of tobacco-related deaths occur in low- and middle-income 
countries.27  According to Dr. Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva, head 
of WHO’s convention secretariat, “[t]he epicentre of this 
                                                          
19 WHO FCTC, supra note 14, at 1. 
20 WHO Tobacco Threatens Us All, supra note 11, at 2. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 3. 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2580. 
26 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2579. 
27 WHO World No Tobacco Day, supra note 6. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/2
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epidemic has moved to the developing world, where low- and 
middle-income countries struggle to combat a tobacco industry 
seeking to pursue new markets, often through shameless 
interference with public health policymaking.”28  Moreover, 
vulnerable populations and disadvantaged communities are 
disproportionately impacted.29  The WHO warns that smoking is 
starting at increasingly early ages;30 tobacco consumption by 
women and young girls has been increasing;31 and tobacco 
consumption by indigenous peoples remains high.32 
 
Even in higher-income countries, lower-income people are 
disproportionately impacted.  For example, in Australia, tobacco 
smoking accounts for “12.1% of the total burden of disease and 
20% of deaths among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples.”33 
 
Moreover, there are adverse environmental impacts. 
According to the WHO, “[t]obacco smoke emissions also 
contribute thousands of tonnes of human carcinogens, toxicants 
and greenhouse gases to the environment.”34  It also contributes 
to deforestation.  For every 300 cigarettes produced, one tree is 
lost.35  Waste discarded from cigarette consumption totals up to 
680,000 tons globally per year.36  Tackling tobacco control is 
evidently not easy.  Tobacco companies spend staggering sums 
of money to retain and expand their market.  United 
States (U.S.) Congressional findings forming the basis of the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) 
noted that “[i]n 2005, the cigarette manufacturers spent more 
than $13,000,000,000 to attract new users, retain current users, 
increase current consumption, and generate favorable long-term 
attitudes toward smoking and tobacco use.”37  ”According to the 
                                                          
28 WHO Report, supra note 8, at 17. 
29 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2580. 
30 WHO FCTC, supra note 14, at 1. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 2. 
33 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2580. 
34 WHO Tobacco Threatens Us All, supra note 11, at 6. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) [hereinafter TCA]. 
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[U.S.] [Federal Trade Commission], tobacco companies spent 
approximately $12.49 billion on advertising and promotion in 
2006 alone, employing marketing and advertising experts to 
incorporate current trends and target their messages toward 
certain demographics.”38 
B. Responses by the WHO and Governmental Tobacco Control 
and Smoking Reduction Initiatives, generally 
The World Health Organization labels the tobacco problem 
as an “epidemic.”39  In fact, in the preamble to its Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the WHO describes the 
“tobacco epidemic” as “a global problem with serious 
consequences for public health that calls for the widest possible 
international cooperation and the participation of all countries 
in an effective, appropriate and comprehensive international 
response” and cites the “devastating worldwide health, social, 
economic and environmental consequences of tobacco 
consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke.”40  For the WHO, 
tobacco control was such a high priority that it was the subject 
of the first convention it ever concluded, in May 2003, taking 
effect in 2005.41  In this landmark initiative, the FCTC 
constructs a two-pronged strategy of decreasing tobacco usage 
through reducing both demand and supply. 
 
The core demand-reduction provisions in the WHO FCTC are 
contained in articles 6-14: 
 Price and tax measures . . . ; and 
 Non-price measures to reduce the demand for tobacco, 
namely: 
 Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke; 
 Regulation of contents of tobacco products; 
 Regulation of tobacco product disclosures; 
 Packaging and labelling of tobacco products; 
                                                          
38 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
39 WHO FCTC, supra note 14, at 1. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at v–vi.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/2
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 Education, communication, training and public 
awareness; 
 Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; 
and 
 Demand reduction measures concerning tobacco 
dependence and cessation. 
The core supply-reduction provisions in the WHO FCTC are 
contained in articles 15-17: 
 Illicit trade in tobacco products; 
 Sales to and by minors; and 
 Provision of support for economically viable alternative 
activities.42 
 
Of note, for purposes of this article is the pledge that 
signatories include large, clear, rotating health warnings on 50% 
(or, at least, 30%) of the principal display area on the package.43  
The WHO’s subsequent Guidelines for Implementation of Article 
11 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(Packaging and Labelling of Tobacco Products) specifically 
encourages the adoption of plain packaging: “[p]arties should 
consider adopting measures to restrict or prohibit the use of 
logos, colours, brand images or promotional information on 
packaging other than brand names and product names 
displayed in a standard colour and font style (plain 
packaging).”44  The Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 
13 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
describes plain packaging as: 
 
[B]lack and white or two other contrasting colours, as prescribed 
by national authorities; nothing other than a brand name, a 
product name and/or manufacturer’s name, contact details and the 
quantity of product in the packaging, without any logos or other 
features apart from health warnings, tax stamps and other 
government-mandated information or markings; prescribed font 
                                                          
42 Id. at v. 
43 Id. at 11. 
44 Guidelines for implementation of Article 11 of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (Packaging and Labelling of Tobacco Products), 
¶ 46, WHO Doc. FCTC/COP3(10) (Nov. 2008).  
9
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style and size; and standardized shape, size and materials.  There 
should be no advertising or promotion inside or attached to the 
package or on individual cigarettes or other tobacco products.45 
 
In part based on the WHO’s international efforts and the 
widespread adoption of the FCTC,46 individual countries (and 
sometimes states, provinces, and municipalities) have developed 
strategies and implemented policies aimed at reducing smoking 
levels.47  Governments have tackled tobacco control with varying 
levels of urgency, focus, effort, commitment, and support.  Some 
countries and regions have adopted far-reaching and sometimes 
creative tobacco control measures.  In 2014, partly to meet its 
FCTC obligations, the European Union introduced the broad-
ranging Tobacco Products Directive (TPD),48 which brought 
                                                          
45 Guidelines for implementation of Article 13, Tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship, ¶ 16, WHO Doc. FCTC/COP3(12) (Nov. 2008); see 
also Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation 
of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1149, 1163 (2013) 
(emphasizing a noncommittal aspect of this FCTC provision stating “[l]egally 
speaking, no FCTC member has an obligation to apply any of [FCTC] 
Guidelines, nor do those Guidelines amend any of the WTO instruments . . . it 
seems self-evident that though they are contextually relevant, the Guidelines 
do not amount to a deletion of TRIPS Agreement obligations.”).   
46 Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/ (last updated 
Nov. 23, 2017) (noting between its adoption in May 2003 and the closure if the 
Convention signature period in June 2004, 168 states signed the FCTC; 
currently, there are 181 member states). 
47 See Thomas Bollyky & David Fidler, Has a Global Tobacco Treaty Made 
a Difference?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2015) https://www. 
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/02/has-a-global-tobacco-treaty-made-a-
difference/386399/ (“A decade later, it is clear that the FCTC, on its own, was 
insufficient to generate improved tobacco control in low- and middle-income 
countries, but has been a contributing factor in the recent progress that has 
occurred.”). But see Lorraine Craig et. al., Impact of the WHO FCTC on Tobacco 
Control: Perspectives from Stakeholders in 12 Countries, 28 TOBACCO CONTROL 
129, 134 (2019) (“[I]n its first decade, the FCTC has had significant impacts on 
tobacco control according to stakeholders in each of the 12 mission countries. 
Stakeholders were unanimous in the view that without the Treaty, tobacco 
control would not have advanced to the extent it had at the time of the 
interviews. The FCTC has elevated tobacco control as a public health priority 
in the national and international agendas, and provided a best practice 
roadmap and mechanisms to support evidence-based action on tobacco within 
a supporting legally binding framework.”). 
48 Directive 2014/40, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 
April 2014 on the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/2
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major changes to tobacco marketing.  At the time the TPD 
became effective, Dr. Martina Pötschke-Langer, Head of Unit 
Cancer Prevention WHO Collaborating Centre for Tobacco 
Control, German Cancer Research Center, said, “[t]he past two 
years have been an intense time for those of us working in 
tobacco control. The European Commission has adopted nine 
legal acts . . . containing the detailed technical rules needed to 
implement the TPD [including] . . . the appearance of the new 
health warnings.”49 
 
Presumably to help curtail smoking by young people, in 
March, 2019, the WHO urged governments “to implement their 
domestic laws banning tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship in the strongest possible ways.  This may include 
issuing penalties applicable under domestic laws and taking 
preventative action, such as by preventing screening of events 
that violate domestic laws.”50  It also urged enforcement of bans 
on tobacco advertising at sporting events51 and international 
exhibitions.52 
 
Other countries restrict tobacco products, marketing and 
distribution less severely than the European Union, sometimes 
falling short of FCTC guidelines. In the United States, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) has had the authority to 
regulate tobacco products since the passage of the TCA in 2009.53  
                                                          
sale of tobacco and related products and Repealing Council Directive 
2001/37/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 127) 1, 1–38. 
49 Dr. Martina Pötschke-Langer, The Tobacco Products Directive – 
Implementation in the EU, HEALTH-EU (Eur. Commission) May 26, 2016. 
50 WHO urges governments to enforce bans on tobacco advertising, 
promotion, and sponsorship, including in motor sport, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 




52 WHO statement urging governments to ban tobacco advertising, 




53 TCA, supra note 37, at 1776; see, e.g., Micah L. Berman, The Faltering 
Promise of FDA Tobacco Regulation, 12 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 145, 
145 (2018) (debating the effectiveness of the FDA’s efforts to control tobacco 
usage under the TCA). 
11
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Ten years later, the FDA announced a “Comprehensive Plan for 
Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation”54 which proposed regulation 
of nicotine levels, increasing use of medicinal products to assist 
in quitting smoking, public education campaign, addressing 
vaping safety and more.55  It also covered revision of warning 
labels—not surprisingly, since “[i]n the U.S., 
cigarette packages still have the small, text-only warnings that 
have been on the side of cigarette packages since 1965.”56  The 
FDA was instructed to issue regulations concerning graphic 
warning labels on certain tobacco products within two years of 
the TCA’s enactment,57 which resulted in the eventual proposal 
of nine images to pair with the nine textual warnings outlined 
in the statute.58  However, when the FDA was challenged by R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company on First Amendment grounds, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld 
summary judgment in favor of the Tobacco Company, vacated 
the graphic warning requirements, and remanded to the FDA.59  
On January 30, 2020, the FDA again attempted to require 
graphic warnings on cigarette packaging by proposing “13 . . . 
warnings, which feature text statements accompanied by photo-
realistic color images depicting some of the lesser-known health 
risks of cigarette smoking, [which] stand to represent the most 
significant change to cigarette labels in 35 years.”60  In South 
                                                          
54 FDA’s Comprehensive Plan for Nicotine and Tobacco Regulation, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/ctp-newsroom 
/fdas-comprehensive-plan-tobacco-and-nicotine-regulation (last visited Mar. 
28, 2020).  
55 Id.  
56 Berman, supra note 53, at 153. 
57 See TCA, supra note 37, 1845 (“Not later than 24 months after the date 
of enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, the 
Secretary shall issue regulations that require color graphics depicting the 
negative health consequences of smoking . . . . The Secretary may adjust the 
type size, text and format of the label statements [as previously] specified . . . 
as the Secretary determines appropriate so that both the graphics and the 
accompanying label statements are clear, conspicuous, legible and appear 
within the specified area”). 
58 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 
Fed. Reg. 36639 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.1141) (listing 
the nine warning labels to be produced on tobacco products). 
59 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
60 Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www 
.fda.gov/tobacco-products/labeling-and-warning-statements-tobacco-
products/cigarette-health-warnings (last visited Mar. 28, 2020). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/2
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Africa, also a signatory to the FCTC, tobacco advertising and 
promotion is severely limited as smoking can be restricted in 
both public and workplace areas and text-only health warnings 
are required.61  Nevertheless, tobacco excise taxes fall far short 
of the WHO’s recommendation that excise tax account for 70% 
of retail prices.62 
 
Approximately 120 countries have adopted graphic 
warnings labels for cigarette packages, starting with Canada in 
2000.63  As a result, the number of people living in countries that 
have introduced tobacco control measures quadrupled between 
2009 and 2019, to a total of 5 billion people.64  Warnings have 
been a prominent part of these measures in many countries.  As 
of September 2018, “107 countries/jurisdictions have required 
warnings to cover at least 50% of the package front and back (on 
average), up from 94 in 2016 and 24 in 2008 [and t]here are now 
55 countries/jurisdictions with a size of at least 65% (on average) 
of the package front and back.”65 
C. History, Background and Context of Australia’s Tobacco 
Plain Packaging Act 
In June of  2009, Australia’s Preventative Health Taskforce 
unveiled its report, “Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020” 
a National Preventative Health Strategy.66  The report provided 
                                                          
61 South Africa Tobacco Control Policies, CAMPAIGN TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, 
https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/legislation/factsheet_pdf/policy_status/so
uth-africa (last visited Mar. 28, 2020).  
62 Id. 
63 Associated Press, U.S. makes new push for graphic warning labels on 
cigarettes, NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2019, 2:41 PM), https://www.nbcnews. 
com/health/health-news/us-makes-new-push-graphic-warning-labels-
cigarettes-n1042866. 
64 WHO launches new report on the global tobacco epidemic, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., (July 26, 2019), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/26-07-
2019-who-launches-new-report-on-the-global-tobacco-epidemic; see generally 
Tobacco Control Laws, CAMPAIGN TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www. 
tobaccocontrollaws.org/ (providing an excellent overview of tobacco control 
legislation and litigation all over the world) (last visited Mar. 28, 2020). 
65 CANADIAN CANCER SOCIETY, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS: 
INTERNATIONAL STATUS REPORT 2 (6th ed. 2018). 
66 NAT’L PREVENTATIVE HEALTH TASKFORCE, AUSTRALIA: THE HEALTHIEST 
COUNTRY BY 2020 17–19 (June 30, 2009) [hereinafter Nat’l Preventative Health 
Taskforce]. 
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a roadmap which lists and describes actions to achieve the 
ambitious goal of becoming the world’s healthiest country by 
2020.67  Tobacco control is featured prominently (not 
surprisingly) in this report.  Further, the report provides that, 
in Australia, tobacco use remains one of the leading causes of 
preventable disease and premature death and that as many as 
two in three Australian smokers will die prematurely from 
smoking-related diseases.68  The report also discusses that 
smokers in Australia are twice as likely as non-smokers to have 
been diagnosed or treated for a mental illness.69  According to 
the Australian Government Department of Health, smoking 
killed about 19,000 Australians in 2011.70  The taskforce report 
included eleven “key action areas” related to tobacco control.71  
These key action areas ranged from increasing tobacco costs to 
raising the intensity and reach of both social marketing and 
public awareness campaigns to eliminating second-hand smoke 
in public places.72  It also recommended boosting efforts to 
reduce and discourage smoking among young people, indigenous 
Australians, and disadvantaged groups.73  Importantly, it is 
within this far-reaching plan that the task force also included 
recommendations specific to the marketing and advertising of 
tobacco products.74  Under the heading “Tobacco,” action items 3 
and 5, respectively, state: 
 
3. End all remaining forms of advertising and promotion of tobacco 
products. 
 Legislate to eliminate all remaining forms of tobacco 
promotion, including, as feasible, through new and 
emerging forms of media 
 Amend legislation nationally and in all states and 
                                                          
67 Id. at 6–7. 
68 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, at ¶ 7.2578 
(referencing paragraphs 1 and 28–30 of Australia’s first written submission). 
69 Id. ¶ 7.1318.  
70 National Tobacco Campaign, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
https://www.health.gov.au/initiatives-and-programs/national-tobacco-
campaign (last updated Dec. 24, 2019). 
71 Nat’l Preventative Health Taskforce, supra note 66, at 12–25. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 37–38. 
74 Id.at 33–34.  
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territories to ensure that tobacco is out-of-sight in retail 
outlets 
 Eliminate the promotion of tobacco products through 
design of packaging 
 Amend Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 
to require that no tobacco product may be sold 
except in packaging of a shape, size, material and 
colour prescribed by government. 
 Amend Trade Practices CPIS (Tobacco) 
Regulations 2004 to specify exact requirements for 
plain packaging 
. . . 
 
5. Regulate manufacturing and further regulate packaging and 
supply of tobacco products 
 Improve consumer information related to tobacco products 
 Mandate standard plain packaging of all tobacco 
products to ensure that design features of the pack 
in no way reduce the prominence or impact of 
prescribed government warnings 
 Automatically review and upgrade warnings on 
tobacco packages at least every three years, with 
the Chief Medical Officer to have the capacity to 
require amendments and issue additional 
warnings of new and emerging risks in between. 
 Tighten and enforce legislation to eliminate sales to 
minors and any form of promotion at retail level. 
 Give government power to regulate design, contents and 
maximum emissions for tobacco and related products, and 
establish a regulatory body with responsibility for 
specifying required disclosure to government, labelling 
and any other communication to consumers 
 Investigate the feasibility of legal action by governments 
and others against tobacco companies75 
 
On April 29, 2010, the Australian Government announced 
measures to ““deliver on [the] recommendations of the 
                                                          
75 Id. at 17–18. 
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[NPHT]”“76 including increasing tobacco excise by 25%; enacting 
legislation to require that all cigarettes be sold in plain 
packaging by 1 July 2012; restricting Australian internet 
advertising of tobacco products; and spending more on anti-
smoking campaigns.77  Ultimately, this led to implementation of 
a comprehensive range of Australian tobacco control measures, 
“including advertising and promotional bans, excise measures, 
graphic health warnings, and investments in anti-smoking 
initiatives.”78  This also lead to tobacco plain packaging 
measures.79  A defensive strategy was employed to combat the 
realities of the tobacco industry’s marketing.  As Professor 
Andrew Mitchell of Melbourne Law School explains, cigarette 
companies invest heavily in packaging and brand name design 
in part because “approximately half of smokers cannot 
distinguish between similar cigarettes”80 and therefore 
“packaging is necessary for product differentiation.”81  He notes 
the particular importance of packaging “in ‘dark’ markets, such 
as Australia, where tobacco advertising is banned”82 since fewer 
marketing distribution channels mean pressure to utilize fully 
the sole remaining possibility, the product package itself. 
D. Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, 
corresponding regulation and challenges in Australian court 
Pursuant to NPHT recommendations and with the goal of 
giving effect to its obligations under the FCTC, the Australian 
Parliament passed the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 
                                                          
76 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 2.8. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. ¶ 7.2581. 
79 INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON DRUGS, NATIONAL TOBACCO STRATEGY 
2012-2018 iii (2012) (identifying Australia’s continued prioritization of 
controlling tobacco use in nine areas: protect public health policies from 
tobacco industry interference; eliminate the remaining advertising, promotion 
and sponsorship of tobacco products; reduce the affordability of tobacco 
products; increase smoke-free areas; strengthening mass media and public 
education campaigns; improving access to evidence-based cessation services; 
and considering further regulation of tobacco contents, disclosure and supply). 
80 Andrew Mitchell, Australia’s Move to the Plain Packaging of Cigarettes 
and its WTO Compatibility, 5 ASIAN J. OF WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 399, 
401, 401–02 (2010). 
81 Id. at 402. 
82 Id. at 402.  
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(TPP).83  As of December 1, 2012, all tobacco products sold, 
offered for sale, or otherwise supplied in Australia were required 
to comply with TPP.84  The Act states: 
(1) The objects of this Act are: 
(a)  to improve public health by: 
(i)  discouraging people from taking up smoking, or 
using tobacco products; and  
(ii)  encouraging people to give up smoking, and to 
stop using tobacco products; and  
(iii)  discouraging people who have given up smoking, 
or who have stopped using tobacco products, from 
relapsing; and  
(iv)  reducing people’s exposure to smoke from tobacco 
products; and 
(b)  to give effect to certain obligations that Australia has as 
a party to the Convention on Tobacco Control. 
(2) It is the intention of the Parliament to contribute to achieving 
the objects in subsection (1) by regulating the retail packaging and 
appearance of tobacco products in order to: 
(a) reduce the appeal of tobacco products to consumers; and 
(b) increase the effectiveness of health warnings on the 
retail packaging of tobacco products; and 
(c) reduce the ability of the retail packaging of tobacco 
products to mislead consumers about the harmful effects of 
smoking or using tobacco products.85 
 
In its subsequent defense when challenged at the WTO, 
Australia asserted that important purposes of the Act where to 
“limit the ability of the pack to distract from and reduce the 
noticeability of GHWs [graphic health warnings]; prevent 
tobacco companies from using different colours to create 
misleading perception of the harmful effects of tobacco use or to 
exploit certain positive associations with particular colours; and, 
                                                          
83 See TTP Act 2011, supra note 2. 
84 Id. (different sections of the Act became effective at different times, with 
all provisions becoming effective by December, 2012). 
85 Id. ch 1 pt I div 3. 
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more broadly, to denormalize tobacco.”86 
 
Under the Act, these objectives are accomplished by 
stripping the packaging of essentially all trademark features 
except the tradename.  TPP measures detail comprehensive 
specifications for all aspects of cigarette packages.  Decorative 
ridges or irregularities of shape or texture and colored glues and 
adhesives are not permitted.87  The dimensions of cigarette 
packs are specified:88 the opening of the pack must be flip-top;89 
the material must be made only of rigid cardboard;90 the shape 
must be rectangular91 and without embellishment;92 only foil-
backed paper lining is permitted;93 and unless otherwise 
permitted, the pack must have a “matte finish” of “drab dark 
brown.”94  No variations for the shape, material, or texture of the 
package are permitted.95  In effect, the cigarette package must 
be stripped of all colors, logos, textures, and other branding.  The 
display of the product name is also strictly controlled.96  The 
brand name must appear in the prescribed font, size and 
placement on the package.97  In addition, health warnings and 
graphic images are required to be included on the product’s 
package.98 
 
A detailed description of domestic challenges to the TPP are 
beyond the scope of this paper, except to note briefly that failed 
challenges to TPP on constitutional grounds were raised by four 
tobacco companies in JT International SA v. Commonwealth of 
                                                          
86 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2476. 
87 TPP Act 2011, supra note 2, ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 18 para 1. 
88 Id. ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 18 para 1; see also Tobacco Plain Packaging 
Regulations 2011 (Cth) pt II div 2 sub-div 1 (Austl.) (determining the 
“[p]hysical features of retail packaging”) [hereinafter TPP Regulations 2011]. 
89 TPP Act 2011, supra note 2, ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 18 para 3. 
90 Id. ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 18 para 2. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 18 para 1. 
93 Id. ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 18 para 3 (stating “must comply”). 
94 Id. ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 19 para 2. 
95 See TPP Act 2011, supra note 2, ch 2 pt 2 div 1 sub-div 18 para 3 (stating 
“must comply”). 
96 Id. ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 26. 
97 TPP Regulations 2011, supra note 88, pt II div 2 sub-div 4 para 1. 
98 TPP Act 2011, supra note 2, ch 2 pt II div 1 sub-div 21. 
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Australia99 and British American Tobacco Australasia Limited 
v. The Commonwealth.100  These cases were consolidated and 
ultimately brought to the High Court of Australia.  As explained 
by Jonathan Liberman, Director of the McCabe Centre for Law 
and Cancer: 
 
The case was decided in the Australian Government’s favor on the 
basis of the majority’s affirmation (six-to-one) of what Justices 
Hayne and Bell described as the “bedrock principle” that “[T]here 
can be no acquisition of property without ‘the Commonwealth or 
another acquir[ing] an interest in property, however slight or 
insubstantial it may be.’”  ”[T]he relevant constitutional question 
is whether there has been an acquisition of property, not whether 
there has been a taking.”  The tobacco companies were unable to 
show any such acquisition. Arguments by the tobacco companies 
that there need be no acquisition of “property” or of a benefit or 
advantage of a proprietary nature ”sought to depart from [the] 
bedrock principle.”101 
II. CHALLENGES TO AUSTRALIA’S TPP MEASURES AT THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION 
A. Public Health/World Trade tension, conflict, background 
Domestic legal challenges aside, the case challenging TPP 
measures raises interesting questions about conflicts and 
tensions between public health policy and law on one hand and 
world trade policy and law on the other.  To start, the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) recognizes the importance of prioritizing public 
health.102  TRIPS Article 8.1 (under the title General Provisions 
and Basic Principles) states: “[m]embers may, in formulating or 
amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are 
                                                          
99 JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.). 
100 See id. (consolidating opinion with JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth). 
101 Jonathan Liberman, Plainly Constitutional: The Upholding of Plain 
Tobacco Packaging by the High Court of Australia, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 
370–71 (2013). 
102 See generally TRIPS, supra note 5. 
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consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”103  Later, the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted 
by the WTO on November 14, 2001, specifically states, “[w]e 
agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not 
prevent Members from taking measures to protect public 
health . . . . [W]e affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health.”104  Numerous WTO 
panel decisions and Appellate Body decisions acknowledge and 
support deference to health measures and the promotion of 
public health over promotion of international trade.105 
B. WTO Dispute Settlement, overview and procedural 
background 
On April 4, 2012, Honduras requested consultations at the 
WTO with Australia, challenging Australia’s TPP measures.106  
Subsequently, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Indonesia 
joined in requesting consultations with Australia on this matter, 
with several other countries requesting to participate in the 
proceedings as third parties.107  The complaints were 
consolidated into Dispute Settlement 435, wherein 
complainants advanced multiple legal challenges to Australia’s 
TPP measures, asserting violations of several provisions of 
TRIPS, the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).108 
                                                          
103 Id. pt I art. 8.1. 
104 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and 
public health of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 4 ILM 746 
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
105 See, e.g., Appellate Body, United States – Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996) 
[hereinafter US – Gasoline] (affirming GATT Article XX’s provision to permit 
important state interests, including the protection of human health); see also 
Appellate Body, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 
2001) (discussing in Section VII Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 11 
of the DSU, specifically referring to the issue of protecting human life or 
health). 
106 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 1.1.  
107 Id. ¶¶ 1.19, 1.23. 
108 Id. ¶¶ 7.3.5.2.1–7.3.5.2.3 (specifically, complainants alleged the 
following violations: 1. Article 2.1 of the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement, claiming Australia’s PP regulations accord to imported tobacco 
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The resulting Panel Report, issued June 28, 2018, spans 888 
pages and provides detailed reviews of the complainants’ 
respondents’ and third parties’ arguments, as well as the panel’s 
rationale and decision for all eleven treaty provision violations 
alleged.109  For purposes of this article, only TRIPS Article 20 is 
examined.  The language of Article 20 itself (stating “[t]he use of 
a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably 
encumbered by special requirements”) embodies the essential 
tension between health policy and trademark rights.110  Several 
of the other provisions that the complainants allege were 
violated are important, but they are more technical and 
arguably less demonstrative of the health policy versus the 
trademark rights dispute. 
                                                          
products treatment less favorable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin; 2. Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, claiming Australia’s PP 
regulations create unnecessary obstacles to trade because they are more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective; 3. Article 2.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, in particular, (i) Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention, 
because trademarks registered in a country of origin outside Australia are not 
protected “as is”; and, (ii) Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, because 
Australia does not provide effective protection against unfair competition, for 
example, creating confusion between the goods of competitors; 4. Article 3.1 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, claiming Australia accords to nationals of other 
Members treatment less favorable than it accords to its own nationals with 
respect to the protection of intellectual property; 5. Article 15.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, claiming nature of the goods to which a trademark is to be applied 
forms an obstacle to the registration of the trademark; 6. Article 16.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, claiming the measures prevent owners of registered 
trademarks from enjoying the rights conferred by a trademark; 7. Article 16.3 
of the TRIPS Agreement, claiming the measures prevent owners of registered 
trademarks that are “well known” from enjoying the rights conferred by a 
trademark; 8. Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement, claiming the use of 
trademarks in relation to tobacco products is unjustifiably encumbered by 
special requirements, such as (i) use in a special form, for example, the uniform 
typeface, font, size, color, and placement of the brand name, and, (ii) use in a 
manner detrimental to the trademark’s capability to distinguish tobacco 
products of one undertaking from tobacco products of other undertakings; 9. 
Article 22.2(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, because Australia does not provide 
effective protection against acts of unfair competition with respect to 
geographical indications, for example, creating confusion among consumers 
with respect to the origin of goods; 10. Article 24.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
because Australia is diminishing the level of protection it affords to 
geographical indications as compared with the level of protection that existed 
prior to 1 January 1995; and 11. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, because the 
measures at issue accord to imported tobacco products treatment less favorable 
than that accorded to like products of national origin).  
109 See generally id. 
110 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 20. 
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C. Trademarks under TRIPS, generally 
There has been much discussion (and confusion) regarding 
the nature of trademark rights under WTO rules and the extent 
to which countries must extend trademark protection.  A good 
starting point is TRIPS Article 16, which states: 
 
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right 
to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from 
using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or 
services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which 
the trademark is registered where such use would result in a 
likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for 
identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be 
presumed.  The rights described above shall not prejudice any 
existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the possibility of 
Members making rights available on the basis of use.111 
 
Appellate Reports and Panel Reports have helped illustrate 
and explain the nature of these exclusive rights.112  In United 
States Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, the 
appellate body agreed with a previous panel report that “the 
definition of the conditions of [trademark] ownership has been 
left to the legislative discretion of individual countries of the 
Paris Union by Article 6(1) of the Paris Convention (1967).”113  
The appellate body opined that once trademark ownership is 
established, “Article 16 confers on the owner of a registered 
trademark an internationally agreed minimum level of 
‘exclusive rights’ that all WTO Members must guarantee in their 
domestic legislation.  These exclusive rights protect the owner 
against infringement of the registered trademark by 
unauthorized third parties.”114 
 
While the right of exclusivity for a registered trademark 
owner is established, the right of exploitation is not guaranteed.  
                                                          
111 Id. art. 16. 
112 See supra note 108. 
113 Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 189, WTO Doc.  WT/DS176/AB/R (adopted Feb. 
1, 2002). 
114 Id. ¶ 186. 
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Some scholars, like Professor Mark Davison of Monash 
University, maintain that TRIPS Article 16 “only confers a right 
to prevent others using a trademark,”115 but does not confer a 
right to use a trademark.  This is consistent with the Panel 
Report in European Communities — Protection of Trademarks 
and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs which stated: 
 
[T]he TRIPS Agreement does not generally provide for the grant 
of positive rights to exploit or use certain subject matter, but 
rather provides for the grant of negative rights to prevent certain 
acts.  This fundamental feature of intellectual property protection 
inherently grants Members freedom to pursue legitimate public 
policy objectives since many measures to attain those public policy 
objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and 
do not require an exception under the TRIPS Agreement.116 
 
Presumably then, businesses from WTO Member countries 
do not have the inherent right to have or to use a trademark in 
another Member country.  However, if they register a 
(presumably valid) trademark, they must be granted a minimal 
level of exclusive rights.  Here, “exclusive rights” means the 
business is the only one granted the rights and may, as a 
corollary, exclude others from infringing on the rights.117 
D. Panel’s analysis of Article 20 claims and rationale for their 
decision 
As noted above, this article focuses on the allegation that 
TPP measures violate TRIPS Article 20, which is only one of 
several violations alleged in the requests for dispute resolution.  
                                                          
115 Mark Davison, Why the TRIPS Challenges to Plain Packaging Will 
Fail, MCCABE CENTRE, http://www.mccabecentre.org/downloads/ 
M_Davison_TRIPS_for_website_word_format_-_1.pdf. 
116 Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶ 7.210, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS174/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter EC – 
Geographical Indications]. 
117 See Mark Davison & Patrick Emerton, Rights, Privileges, Legitimate 
Interests and Justifiability: Article 20 of TRIPS and Plain Packaging of 
Tobacco, 29 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 505, 518–19, 541, 547 (2014) (addressing the 
questions of whether TRIPS article 20 creates a privilege, right of use, or a 
negative right).  
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Article 20 states that: 
 
The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be 
unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements, such as use 
with another trademark, use in a special form or use in a manner 
detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or services of 
one undertaking from those of other undertakings.  This will not 
preclude a requirement prescribing the use of the trademark 
identifying the undertaking producing the goods or services along 
with, but without linking it to, the trademark distinguishing the 
specific goods or services in question of that undertaking.118 
 
Regarding Article 20 specifically, the EC – Geographical 
Indications panel stated Article 20 does “not preclude a 
requirement prescribing the use of [a] trademark” in a certain 
way,119  nor does it address the issue of exclusivity.120  The 
question remains as to when prescribing the use of a trademark 
in a certain way is within the boundaries of Article 20. 
At the outset of its Article 20 analysis, the Panel reviewed 
and decided the issue of burden of proof.121  The parties agreed 
that the complainants were required to establish a prima facie 
case that the TPP measures constituted “special requirements 
that encumber the use of trademarks in the course of trade 
within the meaning of Article 20.”122  Still, they disagreed as to 
whether the complainants or Australia bore the burden of 
proving the justifiability of encumbrances within the scope of 
Article 20.123  Justifiability of encumbrances would prove to be, 
as argued later in this article, the key issue of contention and of 
importance in this case.124 
 
Complainants and third-party Members posed, inter alia, 
the following arguments in favor of Australia bearing the burden 
of proving relevant special requirements were justified.  First, 
the structure of Article 20’s language (“use . . . shall not be 
                                                          
118 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 20. 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 7.2151–7.2171. 
122 Id. ¶ 7.2161.   
123 Id. ¶ 7.2162. 
124 See infra Part 2(D)(iii). 
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unjustifiably encumbered”125) implies a presumption in favor of 
the unencumbered use of trademarks through special 
requirements since unencumbered trademarks are the normal 
default.  Any encumbrance of the use of a trademark through 
special requirements “triggers the obligation to ensure that any 
such [obligation] is justifiable.”126  Second, the prohibitive aspect 
of Article 20 is being qualified through the word “unjustifiably.”  
As such, “the complainant bears the initial burden of 
demonstrating the prohibitive aspect of the provision (i.e. that a 
measure involves an encumbrance on use by special 
requirements); thereafter, the burden of demonstrating that the 
encumbrance is justifiable shifts to the respondent.”127  Third, 
requiring that the Member ensure an encumbrance is justifiable 
“is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term ‘justifiable’, 
which means ‘defensible’ . . . because the ordinary meaning of 
this term suggests that it is the defendant who bears the burden 
of ‘justifying’ a measure that falls within . . . Article 20.”128  
Fourth, it is incorrect for a complainant “to identify and refute a 
justification which it may be unaware of or which it may not be 
able to particulari[z]e.”129  Fifth, and finally,  Article 20 
establishes a general prohibition on the use of special 
requirements, and prior WTO panel decisions support the view 
that “a party invoking an exception or an affirmative defence 
bears the burden of proof.”130 
 
Australia and others agreed that the burden of proof rests 
with the party (whether complaining or defending) who “asserts 
the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.”131  However, 
Australia argued, nothing in the TRIPS Agreement requires 
Members to confer trademark use to a fellow Member.  
Therefore, Article 20 is not in fact an “exception,” so the use of 
                                                          
125 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 20. 
126 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2135. 
127 Id. ¶ 7.2141. 
128 Id. ¶ 7.2140. 
129 Id. ¶ 7.2142; see also Frankel & Gervais, supra note 45, at 1210 
(arguing that normally, the complainant has the burden of proof, but because 
the complainant is not the party who relies on a domestic policy reasons for the 
encumbrance, the respondent carries the burden to show that the 
encumbrance is justified). 
130 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2144.   
131 Id. ¶ 7.2145. 
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special requirements does not carry with it the burden of proving 
any corresponding encumbrances are justified.132  In essence, 
there is no right to use a trademark, so Article 20 is not, in fact, 
a prohibition with an exception.  Therefore, the complainants 
bear the burden of proving all elements of their prima facie case, 
including the element of unjustifiability.133  In resolving this 
issue, the Dispute Panel relied on the Appellate Body’s previous 
endorsement of the principle that “the party asserting a fact, 
whether complainant or respondent, is responsible for providing 
proof thereof” and that “[t]he burden of proof rests upon the 
party . . . who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or 
defence.”134  The Dispute Panel expressly rejected the claim that 
Article 20’s text or grammatical structure implies that there is a 
“default situation” of unencumbered trademark use, causing 
Australia to bear the burden of showing “justifiability.”135  
Referencing previous Appellate Body decisions relevant to this 
question, the Panel noted that other similarly worded provisions 
containing “negative” formulations have not been interpreted as 
placing a burden of proof on the defendant in connection with 
interpreting the Technical Barriers to Trade Treaty (TBT)136 or 
in the context of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).137  The Panel 
concluded that “it is for the complainants to present a prima 
facie case that the TPP measures amount to special 
requirements and that the use of a trademark in the course of 
                                                          
132 Id. ¶ 7.2146. 
133 Id. ¶ 7.2151. 
134 Id. ¶ 7.2158 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS33/AB/R (adopted May 23, 1997)).   
135 Id. ¶ 7.2163. 
136 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2165 (citing 
Appellate Body Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements, ¶ 379, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/R (adopted May 29, 
2015); and Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 323, 
WT/DS381/AB/RW (adopted Jan. 11, 2019)). 
137 Id. ¶ 7.2168 (quoting Appellate Body Report, European Communities – 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),¶ 109, 
WT/DS26/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) stating: “it was the complainant’s task 
to present evidence and legal arguments sufficient to demonstrate a violation 
of the obligations contained in each specific relevant provision of [the 
Agreement]”)). 
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trade is unjustifiably encumbered by these requirements.”138 
 
Having established the threshold burden of proof question, 
the Panel then broke its analysis into three parts, each of which 
will be examined in detail: first, whether TPP measures involve 
“special requirements” that “encumber” the use of a trademark; 
second, whether the special requirements in the TPP measures 
encumber the “use of a trademark” “in the course of trade;” and 
third, whether the TPP measures “unjustifiably” encumber the 
use of trademarks in the course of trade.139 
1. Whether TPP measures involve “special requirements” that 
“encumber” the use of a trademark (7.3.5.3) 
Are Australia’s TPP measures “special requirements”?  If so, 
do those requirements “encumber” use of cigarette trademarks?  
Neither “special requirement” nor “unjustifiably encumber” are 
defined in the TRIPS agreement. 
a. Meaning of “special requirements” 
Australia agreed there was no question the TPP measures 
constituted special requirements, at least in some respects, but 
that the scope of the special requirements is at issue.140  One 
area of dispute related to the extent to which prohibitions on the 
use of a trademark are “special requirements” within the 
meaning of Article 20.  Australia’s position was that a country 
may prohibit the use of a trademark altogether under TRIPS.141  
Article 19 provides in relevant part that “[c]ircumstances arising 
independently of the will of the owner of the trademark which 
constitute an obstacle to the use of the trademark, such as 
import restrictions on or other government requirements for 
goods or services protected by the trademark, shall be recognized 
as valid reasons for non-use.”142  In Australia’s view, the rights 
Members are required to confer under TRIPS are negative rights 
of exclusion, not a right to a trademark.143  When trademark use 
                                                          
138 Id. ¶ 7.2169. 
139 Id. ¶ 7.2172. 
140 Id. ¶ 7.2138. 
141 Id. ¶ 7.2187. 
142 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 19. 
143 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2188. 
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is permissible, Article 20 is concerned with special requirements 
imposed on trademark use.144  As a result, in Australia’s view, 
Article 20 refers to “how a trademark may be used when it is 
used, not to whether it can be used.”145  If domestic law bans the 
use of certain trademarks, then “those trademarks are not being 
‘use[d] . . . in the course of trade’ and Article 20 is therefore not 
engaged.”146  Under complainants’ interpretations, Australia 
argues, tobacco control measures in common use among WTO 
Members, such as prohibitions on tobacco print and broadcast 
advertising, would fall under Article 20’s scope.147 
 
In response, Indonesia asserted that “Australia’s 
interpretation would create an untenable situation where the 
TRIPS Agreement would allow Members total freedom to impose 
a prohibition on the use of a trademark without justification or 
explanation, but would be required to provide a justification and 
explanation when imposing limitation on the use of a 
trademark.”148  Indonesia argued that Australia’s concern that a 
country’s ability to ban a product could fall within the scope of 
Article 20, thereby undermining other tobacco-control policies, 
is flawed because: 
 
[T]here is a distinction between a general prohibition on the 
availability of a good and a prohibition on the use of a specific 
trademark or a special class of trademarks on a good that is 
lawfully placed on the market.  Article 20 is not concerned with 
the application of any and all requirements that may indirectly 
encumber the use of trademarks.  Rather, it addresses the 
application of “special requirements.”  A general prohibition, such 
as on the sale of a good in the market or on advertising generally, 
does not satisfy the definition of a “special requirement” on the use 
of a trademark.149 
                                                          
144 Id. ¶ 7.2187. 
145 Id. ¶ 7.2185.  
146 Id. ¶ 7.2225. 
147 Id. ¶ 7.2189. 
148 Id. ¶ 7.2202; see also id. ¶ 7.2194 (noting the Dominican Republic made 
a similar point in arguing that a prohibition on use of a trademark would 
clearly be an encumbrance and that it would make no sense to permit a 
Member to severely encumber a trademark to the point of defeating its 
function, yet require a Member to justify a weak form of encumbrance).  
149 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2203. 
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Rather, Article 20 does not apply to advertising bans or 
restrictions on availability of a product.  It applies to “legal 
conditions directly regulating the trademark itself.”150 
 
The Panel rejected Australia’s argument insofar as it 
refused to link governments’ ability to prevent trademark use in 
Article 19 with whether such a ban constitutes a “special 
requirement” under Article 20.  The Panel stated that “[t]he fact 
that Article 19 contemplates the existence of a government 
measure that prevents the use of a trademark . . . does not, as 
such, address whether any such measure would amount to a 
special requirement affecting the use of a trademark and be 
subject to the disciplines of Article 20.”151 
 
On the question of the exact meaning of “special 
requirements” that encumber use of a trademark in the course 
of trade, both parties and non-parties advanced very different 
interpretations.  Even those parties on the same side of the 
dispute interpreted “special requirements” differently.  For 
example, Honduras submitted that a “special requirement” in 
the context of Article 20 means “measures of a compulsory 
nature that are exceptional, address distinctive elements of a 
trademark, or are limited in their application to particular 
aspects of trademarks or their use.”152  The Dominican Republic 
argued that a “special requirement” is a condition mandated by 
the government and is unusual either because “it prescribes ‘use’ 
of a trademark in a manner that departs from the usual 
treatment of a trademark; or . . . it applies to trademarks used 
in connection with a particular type of good or service; or . . . 
both.”153  In Cuba’s estimation, the requirements were “‘special’ 
because they affect only trademarks used on tobacco 
products.”154  Indonesia argued that “‘special requirements’ are 
‘mandated requirements that: 1) apply to a limited product class; 
2) apply only for a particular purpose; or 3) are distinct from 
                                                          
150 Id. ¶ 7.2196. 
151 Id. ¶ 7.2230. 
152 Id. ¶ 7.2176. 
153 Id. ¶ 7.2179. 
154 Id. ¶ 7.2181.   
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those that apply generally or ‘usually’.”155  Under any of these 
interpretations, TPP measures would be considered special 
requirements. 
 
To understand the meaning of the term “special 
requirements” in the context of Article 20, the Panel determined 
that “the term ‘requirements’ is broad in scope.”156  The Panel 
referenced the Oxford English Dictionary entry definition of 
“requirement” as “‘[s]omething called for or demanded; a 
condition which must be complied with.’”157  A “requirement” 
could be permitting or banning “a certain action.”158  The Panel 
also determined that the term “special” suggests two 
connotations: the first “‘[h]aving a close or exclusive connection 
with a specified person [or] thing[;]’” and the second, “being 
‘[e]xceptional in quality or degree; unusual; out of the 
ordinary.’”159 
 
The Panel then concluded this issue by deciding similarly to 
Honduras’ position noted above in stating: 
 
[T]he term “special requirements” refers to a condition that must 
be complied with, has a close connection with or specifically 
addresses the “use of a trademark in the course of trade”, and is 
limited in application.  This may include a requirement not to do 
something, in particular a prohibition on using a trademark.160 
b. Meaning of “encumbrance” 
Next, the Panel frames the question “for the purposes of 
determining whether ‘special requirements’ may be considered 
to ‘encumber the use of a trademark’, [the relevant question] is 
not whether the trademark is being used, but rather whether its 
use is being encumbered by the ‘special requirements’ at 
                                                          
155 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2183. 
156 Id. ¶ 7.2222 (quoting Panel Report, European Communities – Measures 
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS291/R (adopted Nov. 21, 2006) [hereinafter EC – Biotech Products]). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (relying on EC – Biotech Products). 
159 Id. ¶ 7.2223. 
160 Id. ¶ 7.2231. 
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issue.”161 
Disputing Australia’s position, the Panel opined as follows: 
 
[W]e see no basis for assuming that a “special requirement” 
prohibiting entirely the use of a trademark would not “hinder” or 
“hamper” the use of such trademark . . . if the use of a trademark 
is prohibited, it is “encumbered” to the greatest possible extent.  
We are therefore not persuaded that the terms of Article 20 imply 
that only “special requirements” that would determine how a 
trademark may be used . . . may be considered to “encumber the 
use” of such trademark.”162 
 
In essentially concurring with Indonesia’s argument, the 
Panel agrees that Australia’s position is “‘counterintuitive’ . . .  
[in that] a measure that restricts the use of a trademark would 
be subject to . . . Article 20 while a more far-reaching measure to 
prohibit such use would not.”163 
 
The Panel concluded that “the requirements of the TPP 
measures permitting the use of word marks on tobacco retail 
packaging . . . constitute ‘special requirements’ within the 
meaning of Article 20.”164  The Panel further concluded that “[i]t 
is also not in dispute that these requirements ‘encumber’ the use 
of the affected trademarks, in that they restrict the manner in 
which the trademarks at issue may be displayed on the relevant 
products and their packaging.”165  The Panel finally stated: “[w]e 
therefore agree with the parties that these measures affecting 
word marks amount to ‘special requirements’ that ‘encumber’ 





                                                          
161 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2232 (emphasis 
added). 
162 Id. ¶ 7.2236. 
163 Id. ¶ 7.2238. 
164 Id. ¶ 7.2241. 
165 Id. ¶ 7.2242. 
166 Id. ¶ 7.2242. 
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2. Whether the special requirements in the TPP measures 
encumber the “use of a trademark” “in the course of trade” 
(7.3.5.4) 
a. Meaning of “in the course of trade” 
The meaning of “in the course of trade” again elicited a 
diversion of interpretations.  Adopting a narrow reading of the 
phrase, Australia argued that “course of trade” refers to acts 
taken during the buying and selling of goods for profit and that 
“an encumbrance is only relevant under Article 20 insofar as it 
encumbers the use of a trademark while the trademarked 
product remains within the course of trade, which . . . 
culminates at the point of sale.”167  In short, “course of trade” 
means while the trademarked product is being literally traded. 
 
All complainants and third parties interpreted “course of 
trade” more broadly than Australia did.  At one end, Honduras 
interpreted the phrase as capturing all activities related or 
linked to trade including “all activities that have a connection 
with, or a bearing on, trade, including for instance, 
transportation, distribution, display, sale, use, as well as 
advertising.”168  Slightly narrower in scope, the Dominican 
Republic interpreted “course of trade” as “the succession of 
events undertaken in producing, supplying, distributing, selling 
and delivering goods and services for commercial purposes.”169  
Cuba asserted that trademarks are used to distinguish products 
from the perspective of consumers and commercial actors, and 
because they are relevant to buying and selling decisions of those 
actors, they are in the “course of trade.”170  Indonesia asserts 
that “the course of trade” refers to activities conducted in a 
commercial context as opposed to private use and as such, does 
not end at the point of sale.171  The European Union found 
Australia’s position too narrow because it excludes trademarks 
used in advertising, catalogues, and the like.  To be used in the 
course of trade, “the mark must be used publicly and outwardly 
                                                          
167 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2252.   
168 Id. ¶ 7.2248.   
169 Id. ¶ 7.2249.   
170 Id. ¶ 7.2250.   
171 Id. ¶ 7.2251.   
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/2
2020 PACE INT’L L. REV. 279 
in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic 
advantage for the purpose of ensuring an outlet for the goods 
and services which it represents.”172 
 
Again disagreeing with Australia, the panel decided that 
“the course of trade” does not specifically terminate or relate to 
the point of sale or divide pre- and post-sale situations,173 noting 
that in the ordinary meaning of the phrase, course of trade is not 
limited to buying and selling, but rather, it “more broadly covers 
the process relating to commercial activities.”174  Therefore, in 
the context of Article 20, “in the course of trade” does not 
culminate at the point of sale.175 
b. Meaning of “use of a trademark” 
Again, employing a narrow interpretation, Australia argued 
that the use of a trademark is functional only: to distinguish 
goods and services from those of other sources.  As such, Article 
20 does not cover special requirements which encumber the use 
of a trademark for other reasons, such as to convey positive 
associations with a product or to market to particular segments 
of consumers.176  According to Australia, “[t]he use of a 
trademark to advertise and promote . . . is not part of the 
distinguishing function of a trademark” since the tradename 
alone is sufficient to identify the source.177  In support, Australia 
pointed to the definition of “protectable subject matter” in TRIPS 
Article 15.1, which is “‘[a]ny sign, or any combination of signs, 
capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable 
of constituting a trademark’.”178  Because trademarks used to 
advertise and promote products fall outside the distinguishing 
function, they fall outside the purview of Article 20. 
 
 
                                                          
172 Id. ¶ 7.2258. 
173 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2263. 
174 Id. ¶ 7.2261. 
175 Id. ¶ 7.2264. 
176 Id. ¶ 7.2265. 
177 Id. ¶ 7.2267. 
178 Id. ¶ 7.2266. 
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Not surprisingly, complainants opposed this view as too 
limiting.  Honduras, for example, asserted that TRIPS 
protection is not limited to only those elements Members think 
are necessary to distinguish the products, but also covers other 
protection, like figurative elements, that are capable of 
distinguishing products.179  “There is no basis in the TRIPS 
Agreement or in international [Intellectual Property] law 
generally for asserting that word marks distinguish products in 
a neutral manner [without marketing, promotion, etc.] whereas 
figurative elements do not.”180  The Dominican Republic asserted 
that interpretation of the phrase “the use of a trademark is 
encumbered” does not require that the encumbrance on use 
prevent the identification of the commercial source.181 
 
Again, the Panel did not adopt Australia’s position and 
defined “use of a trademark” closer to the complainants’ views.  
The Panel determined that Article 20’s language is broad and 
does not qualify the “use” in any particular way other than being 
in the “course of trade.”182  Also, the definition of protectable 
subject-matter provided in Article 15.1 does not imply any 
limitation on the types of uses that are relevant to Article 20.183  
In conclusion, “the relevant ‘use’ for the purposes of Article 20 is 
not limited to the use of a trademark for the specific purpose of 
distinguishing the goods and services of one undertaking from 
those of other undertakings.”184  As applied to the TPP dispute, 
the Panel finds that TPP measures affect the use of trademarks 
“‘in the course of trade’, even within the narrow meaning given 
to this term by Australia”185 and “amount to special 
requirements that encumber ‘the use of a trademark in the 
course of trade[.]’”186 
 
                                                          
179 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2272. 
180 Id. ¶ 7.2273.   
181 Id. ¶ 7.2276.   
182 Id. ¶ 7.2280. 
183 Id. ¶ 7.2283 (defining “protectable subject matter” as “[a]ny sign or 
combination of signs capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings”). 
184 Id. ¶ 7.2286. 
185 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2288. 
186 Id. ¶ 7.2292. 
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3.  Whether the TPP measures “unjustifiably” encumber the 
use of trademarks in the course of trade (7.3.5.5) 
At the heart of the dispute between complainants and 
Australia lies the disagreement over whether TPP measures are 
an unjustifiable encumbrance.  No prior panel has considered 
the meaning of “unjustifiable” in the context of Article 20.187  
Some legal scholars, like Professor Andrew Mitchell and 
University of Melbourne Law School, correctly predicted in 
advance of the panel’s decision that “[i]f it is established that 
Article 20 applies, the main issue is whether the special 
requirement encumbrance can be justified.”188  This raises a 
critical question, which is how should a Dispute Resolution 
Panel evaluate whether the measures are unjustifiable? 
 
To begin, no party in the case disputes that the pursuit of 
public health is a legitimate objective (articulated in TRIPS 
Article 8.1, noted above).189  However, as Nicaragua asserted, 
although public health is a legitimate policy objective that “does 
not mean that any measure taken in furtherance of public health 
is ‘justifiable.’”190  When pursuing an indisputably legitimate 
objective, to what extent can a Member encumber the trademark 
rights of another Member?  What factors are considered when 
determining whether the use of a trademark in the course of 
trade is being unjustifiably encumbered by special 
requirements?  The following are the positions advanced by 
complainants and respondents in framing how “unjustifiably” 
should be decided. 
a. Meaning of term “unjustifiably” 
Public health objectives, in Honduras’ view, must be 
balanced against Members’ obligation to ensure intellectual 
property rights of fellow Members.191  Achieving this objective 
                                                          
187 Id. ¶ 7.2328 (noting the panel found that Australia states the term 
“unjustifiable” has not been considered by the panel and the Appellate Body in 
the context of Art. 20 but has been considered in other contexts).  
188 Mitchell, supra note 80, at 412. 
189 See supra note 103. 
190 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2372.  
191 Id. ¶ 7.2305 (noting that Honduras extends this by stating that if the 
relevant measures consist of “blanket and indiscriminate restrictions on the 
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rests on a determination of whether the measure “(i) makes a 
material contribution to the public policy objective; and (ii) 
constitutes the least-restrictive means to achieve this objective 
among other options that are reasonably available.”192 
 
In a similar approach, the Dominican Republic advanced a 
legal standard which involves balancing the following four 
factors: the nature and extent of the encumbrance; the objective 
the Member seeks to achieve; whether the encumbrance 
contributes to the objective; and whether less-restrictive 
alternative measures could have been equally effective.193  In 
balancing these interests, the Dominican Republic asserted that 
Article 20 aims to “safeguard[] . . . to the greatest extent 
possible, the ability of a trademark to fulfil its basic function of 
distinguishing goods or services, without prejudicing the ability 
of a Member to achieve other legitimate objectives.”194  Cuba 
submitted that a special requirement is unjustifiable if the 
objective is illegitimate; the special requirement is ineffective in 
achieving its objective; or if the special requirement is 
disproportionate because alternative measures are less of an 
encumbrance.  In this case, Cuba argued that TPP measures are 
unjustifiable because they are ineffective or because they are 
disproportionate.195  Indonesia supported a sliding scale where 
“measures that impose a high degree of encumbrance also 
impose a higher burden on the respondent to justify the 
measure.”196 
 
Based on previous panel and Appellate Body decisions 
interpreting the word “unjustifiably” in other contexts, Australia 
contended “that the use of a trademark in the course of trade is 
‘unjustifiably’ encumbered by special requirements only if there 
is no ‘rational connection’ between the imposition of the special 
requirements and a legitimate public policy objective.”197  
                                                          
use of trademarks” or defeat the core function of a trademark, then no further 
inquiry is necessary and the measures are unjustifiable under Article 20).  
192 Id. (referencing Honduras’s first written submission, para. 315 and 
Honduras’s second written submission, paras. 361–72).   
193 Id. ¶ 7.2311. 
194 Id. ¶ 7.2313. 
195 Id. ¶ 7.2319. 
196 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2324.   
197 Id. ¶ 7.2329 (citing Australia’s first written submission, para. 369 and 
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According to Australia, the relevant inquiry is “whether the 
complainants have shown that the relationship between the 
encumbrance imposed by the measure and the measure’s 
objective is not one that is within the range of rational or 
reasonable outcomes.”198  “Interpreting the term ‘unjustifiably’ 
to include a requirement of ‘least restrictiveness’ would render 
this term functionally equivalent to a standard of ‘necessity’.”199  
Returning to its position that TRIPS ensures negative rights but 
not positive ones, Australia argued, in essence, that 
complainants’ arguments rest on a right of use, but TRIPS does 
not confer a right of trademark use.200 
 
In Australia’s view, “the fact that the TRIPS Agreement 
requires Members to confer certain negative rights of exclusion 
upon IP owners ‘inherently grants Members freedom to pursue 
legitimate public policy objectives’, since most measures that 
regulate the use or exploitation of IP will not interfere with the 
rights of exclusion that Members are required to confer.”201 
 
At the heart of the case is the issue of the meaning and 
implications of the term “unjustifiably.”  The panel noted that: 
 
The parties have discussed extensively the implications of the use 
of the term “unjustifiably” in Article 20 on the nature and extent 
of the relationship that must exist between, on one hand, 
encumbrances on the use of trademarks resulting from the special 
requirements at issue and, on the other, the reasons for which 
these special requirements were adopted, or, in other words, how 
it should be determined whether these reasons are sufficient to 
support, and provide a justification for, the encumbrance resulting 
from the special requirements.202 
 
Fundamentally, two other TRIPS provisions relate to the 
issue of justifiability, Article 8, quoted previously in this article, 
and Article 7.  Article 7, titled “Objectives,” provides that: 
                                                          
noting Australia’s response to Panel question No. 107).   
198 Id. ¶ 7.2330 (citing Australia’s second written submission, para. 149).  
199 Id. ¶ 7.2333.   
200 Id. ¶ 7.2340. 
201 Id. ¶ 7.2345.   
202 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2412. 
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The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and 
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and 
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations.203 
 
The panel noted that Article 8 contextualizes the term 
“unjustifiably” in Article 20 and acknowledges the legitimacy of 
certain reasons for encumbering trademark use, including 
pursuing certain legitimate societal interests.204 
 
In formulating a test for determining whether something is 
unjustifiable in Article 20 cases, the panel rejected Australia’s 
claim that “the use of a trademark is ‘unjustifiably’ encumbered 
only if there is no rational connection between the imposition of 
the special requirements and a legitimate public policy 
objective.”205  Australia rested its argument on its interpretation 
of Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, which, Australia claimed supported 
the view that “the use of a trademark is ‘unjustifiably’ 
encumbered only if there is no rational connection between the 
imposition of the special requirements and a legitimate public 
policy objective.”206  However, the panel noted that it does not 
follow that whenever some degree of rational connection does 
exist, this would always be “sufficient to justify the 
discrimination at issue.”207  Importantly, “the use of the term 
‘unjustifiably’ conveys a requirement that encumbrances . . .  be 
capable of being explained, and that a justification or reason 
should exist that sufficiently supports the encumbrance 
resulting from the action or measure at issue.”208  This involves 
some degree of rational explanation, but the existence of just any 
rational connection will not always be sufficient to support the 
                                                          
203 TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 7.  
204 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 7.2404, 2.2405.  
205 Id. ¶ 7.2420. 
206 Id. ¶ 7.2420 (referencing the summary of Australia’s arguments in 
paras. 7.2328 and 7.2329). 
207 Id. ¶ 7.2421. 
208 Id. ¶ 7.2422. 
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imposition of the encumbrance permissible under Article 20.209 
 
Upon rejecting Australia’s position advancing the rational 
connection argument, the panel articulated the following test: 
 
[W]hether the use of a trademark in the course of trade is being 
“unjustifiably” encumbered by special requirements should 
involve a consideration of the following factors: 
a. the nature and extent of the encumbrance resulting from 
the special requirements, bearing in mind the legitimate interest 
of the trademark owner in using the trademark in the course of 
trade and thereby allowing the trademark to fulfil its intended 
function; 
b. the reasons for which the special requirements are 
applied, including any societal interests they are intended to 
safeguard; and 
c. whether these reasons provide sufficient support for the 
resulting encumbrance.210 
 
The panel specifically avoided determining how exactly the 
interests should be weighed and balanced; instead, the panel 
opined that such an assessment should be carried out on a case-
by-case basis.211 
b. Are the TPP measures per se unjustifiable? 
Before applying the 3-part test, the Panel considered the 
threshold claims argued by all four complainants that the TPP 
measures are per se unjustifiable; therefore, the 3-part test need 
not apply.212  Complainants advance four different reasons why 
TPP measures are per se unjustifiable, thereby obviating the 
need for further analysis and rendering the application of a 
balancing analysis described above unnecessary.213 
 
                                                          
209 Id.  
210 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2430 (emphasis 
added). 
211 Id. ¶ 7.2431. 
212 Id. ¶¶ 7.2433, 7.2434.  
213 Id. ¶ 7.2433. 
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The Panel addressed four arguments in turn. First, 
Honduras and Indonesia argued that the extreme nature of 
the encumbrance, specifically the prohibition on the use of 
stylized work marks, figurative marks, and composite marks 
rises to a level of restrictiveness that cannot be justified.214  On 
this issue, the panel concluded that: 
 
While a prohibition on use of a trademark by nature involves a 
high degree of encumbrance on such use, we see no basis for 
assuming that a particular threshold or degree of encumbrance 
would be inherently “unjustifiable” under this provision. Rather, 
we consider that this must in all cases be assessed in light of the 
circumstances in accordance with the standard of review that we   
    have identified above.215 
 
Second, all four complainants argued that TPP measures 
are unjustifiable because Australia did not assess the 
justifiability of the requirements in respect of individual 
trademarks and their individual features.216  Of the four 
arguments advanced in support of per se unjustifiability, the 
most contested question was: 
 
[W]hether Article 20 requires the “unjustifiability” of any “special 
requirements” imposed on the use of trademarks to be assessed . . . 
in relation to each individual trademark and its specific features 
and whether . . . the encumbrances imposed by the TPP measures 
are per se “unjustifiable” in that they do not involve such an 
individual assessment but rather apply to all trademarks on 
tobacco products without distinction.217 
 
In essence, complainants argued that Australia should have 
separately considered each individual design feature of a 
trademark, such as typeface, size, color, etc.,218 and that each 
type of special requirement and its related encumbrance must 
be evaluated and justified independently.219  Honduras argued 
                                                          
214 Id. ¶ 7.2434. 
215 Id. ¶ 7.2441. 
216 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, at ¶ 7.2434. 
217 Id. ¶ 7.2492. 
218 Id. ¶ 7.2462. 
219 Id. ¶ 7.2465. 
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that since trademarks are “examined and approved on an 
individual basis and exist as individual trademarks,”220 
encumbrances cannot “apply to a broad range of trademarks in 
an indiscriminate manner.”221  The Dominican Republic argued 
that trademark protection is individualized in terms of content, 
acquisition, enjoyment, and enforcement of rights.222  As a 
result, if a Member seeks to encumber the use of a trademark 
through special requirements, it must take appropriate account 
of the individual characteristics of each of the affected 
trademarks.223  However, Australia countered that 
 
[T]he fact that trademarks are ordinarily acquired, registered, and 
enforced on an individual basis is simply a consequence of the fact 
that trademarks must be capable of distinguishing between 
products in the course of trade. It does not follow that any 
justification for the imposition of special requirements upon the 
use of a trademark must likewise be framed by reference to the 
characteristics of individual trademarks.224 
 
Australia also rebutted complainants’ claims by arguing that 
they mischaracterized how TPP measures are designed to 
operate.225  The premise of the TPP measure is not that the 
trademarks increase the appeal of tobacco or decrease health 
warnings. Rather, the premise is that TPP will minimize the 
ability of tobacco packages to have these effects.226  The objective 
is to “eliminate the opportunity for tobacco companies to use the 
package as a medium for advertising and promoting the 
product.”227 
 
Australia made the compelling claim that the complainants 
adopted an “‘extreme evidentiary approach to public health 
policymaking’.”228  Within this approach, Australia would be 
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required to individually assess “each element of each trademark 
for each of the many hundreds of tobacco and cigar packages that 
were on the market in Australia prior to the implementation of 
tobacco plain packaging.”229  Additionally, Australia relied on 
the interpretation of TRIPS Article 17 in EC- Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications (US) where the panel concluded that 
there was “nothing in the text of Article 17 [that] indicate[d] that 
a case-by-case analysis is . . .  require[d] under the TRIPS 
Agreement.”230 
 
As a starting point, the panel referenced the text of Article 
20, noting that the language does not address whether “special 
requirements” refers to individual trademarks or a class of 
trademarks or use of a trademark in a particular situation.231  
Providing many examples, the panel concluded “that the use of 
th[e] term [‘a trademark’] in the singular is a drafting convention 
used in many provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and . . . [does 
not imply] . . . that the justifiability of any special requirements 
must be assessed in respect of each individual trademark.”232  
The panel agreed with the complainants “that trademarks are 
acquired, registered, maintained, invalidated and enforced on an 
individual basis”233 and “that decisions on eligibility for 
protection, registration and invalidation are taken in respect of 
individual trademarks.”234  However, the panel makes the 
critical distinction that Article 20 governs trademark use and 
has no bearing on the eligibility for registration, invalidation of 
trademarks, etc.235 
 
On this issue, the panel found in favor of Australia, 
reasoning that “Article 20 does not require the unjustifiability of 
special requirements under Article 20 to be in all cases assessed 
by a Member in respect of individual trademarks and their 
specific features.”236  The panel believed Australia’s stated 
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rationale for TPP measures and decided that Australia’s 
approach—that prescribing a standardized, plain appearance 
for tobacco packages and products is intended to minimize the 
ability of tobacco packages and products to increase the appeal 
of tobacco products—detracts from the effectiveness of graphic 
health warnings, or mislead consumers as to the harms of 
tobacco use.  They noted that the approach is not, per se, 
unjustifiable.  Rather, to the extent that the requirements at 
issue relate to an entire class of marks or signs, an assessment 
of their unjustifiability is best approached in terms of the extent 
to which this is supported by the reasons for their adoption.237 
 
Third, Indonesia argued that TPP measures are 
unjustifiable because Australia failed to follow its own process 
in adopting them.  Indonesia argues—independently of any 
other complainant—that the TPP measures “unjustifiably 
encumber the use of trademarks in the course of trade because 
Australia had failed to follow its own process in adopting plain 
packaging.”238  Indonesia advanced that “one of the definitions 
for ‘justified’ is ‘to show sufficient lawful reason for an act 
done’.”239  Indonesia argued that Australia failed to follow its 
own regulatory procedures in passing TPP measures, and those 
regulatory procedures were designed to determine, inter alia, 
whether the proposed TPP measures were “justified.”240 
Australia first counterargued that “it fully adhered to its 
own internal administrative and legislative processes in 
developing the TPP measures.”241  Australia’s next counterpoint 
was that whether Australia adhered to its own internal 
processes is “legally irrelevant to the interpretation and 
application of Article 20.”242  Australia argued that adherence to 
domestic law is not relevant because the term “‘unjustifiable’ 
turns on an objective rationale for special requirements [of a 
trademark].”243 
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Again, the panel largely agreed with Australia on this point.  
Although the panel stated that it is possible that: 
 
[T]he manner in which a measure was prepared and adopted may 
inform the assessment of the unjustifiability of specific “special 
requirements” under that standard[,] . . . Article 20 does not 
impose any specific independent obligation on Members as to how 
they should design their domestic legislative procedures or how 
those procedures should operate.  A Member’s compliance with its 
own domestic regulatory procedures does not, in itself, determine 
whether a Member has complied with its obligations under Article 
20.244 
 
Fourth, Cuba argued the TPP measures fall within the 
illustrative list of measures in the first sentence of Article 20 and 
are therefore presumptively invalid.  The first sentence of TRIPS 
Article 20 incorporates examples which Cuba claimed are 
illustrative of trademark restrictions presumed to be 
unjustifiable.245  In relevant part, Article 20 states: 
 
The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be 
unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements, such as use 
with another trademark, use in a special form or use in a manner 
detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or services of 
one undertaking from those of other undertakings.246 
 
The panel agreed with Australia that the examples are 
illustrative of special requirements, not examples of 
encumbrances that are unjustifiable.247 
c. Whether use of a trademark in the course of trade is being 
“unjustifiably” encumbered by special requirements 
Having determined that TPP measures relate to special 
requirements that encumber trademarks in the course of trade, 
and that those encumbrances are not per se unjustifiable, the 
final issue for the panel to resolve in the Article 20 portion of 
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their decision is whether TPP measures constitute an 
unjustifiable encumbrance.  In so doing, the panel applied the 3-
part test articulated previously in its decision and noted the 
need to weigh and balance different interests at issue on a case-
by-case basis.248  The three-part test is as follows: 
 
a. the nature and extent of the encumbrance resulting from 
the special requirements, bearing in mind the legitimate interest 
of the trademark owner in using its trademark in the course of 
trade and thereby allowing the trademark to fulfil its intended 
function; 
b. the reasons for which the special requirements are 
applied, including any societal interests they are intended to 
safeguard; and 
c. whether these reasons provide sufficient support for the 
resulting encumbrance.249 
i. Nature and extent of the encumbrance 
In considering the first factor, the panel considered the 
implications that the constraints have in the marketplace, both 
on (i) a trademark’s ability to distinguish goods and services in 
the course of trade, and (ii) on a trademark owner’s ability to 
extract economic value from the use of its trademark.250 
Arguments presented by the parties on this issue go to the 
ess 
ential purpose of trademarks and to the core of the 
protectable interests trademark law is designed to serve.  It also 
raises the interesting question of whether a trademark is itself 
a form of advertising and/or promotion.  Speaking broadly, 
complainants focused on the complexity of figurative aspects of 
trademarks and the message conveyed to consumers regarding 
branding.  For example, the Dominican Republic argued: 
 
For consumer goods, branding plays a critical role in promoting 
difference in the marketplace. Consumers are usually willing to 
pay a premium for this guarantee of the quality, characteristics 
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and reputation of the product. By distinguishing goods and 
services in the marketplace, and by signaling quality, 
characteristics, and reputation to consumers, trademarks create 
valuable competitive opportunities for producers and exporting 
countries.251 
 
The panel summed up these arguments best: 
 
The complainants have not sought to demonstrate that consumers 
have in fact been unable to distinguish the commercial source of 
tobacco products of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings . . . as a result of the TPP trademark requirements. 
However, . . . they argue that the removal of figurative elements 
has undermined the ability of trademarks to signal individual 
tobacco products’ quality, characteristics and reputation to 
consumers.252 
 
Australia focused more narrowly on the classic definition of 
trademark as an identifier of the source of a product or service.  
For example, Australia argued that TPP measures still permit 
tobacco manufacturers to distinguish their products from those 
of others by allowing them to use company and brand name on 
tobacco retail packaging.253  TPP measures restrict the 
promotional function of trademarks by prohibiting the colors, 
logos, etc.254 and eliminate the use of the package for advertising, 
promoting, and conveying positive associations.255  However, 
this is consistent with FCTC Guidelines Article 13.256  In 
Australia’s view, TPP measures allow tobacco companies to 
identify and distinguish the product’s source in order for 
consumers to expect consistent quality when buying products 
with the same trademark257 and do not impede the use of 
trademarks to convey information about the product’s 
characteristics.  Essentially, the “quality function” is closely 
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related to the “source identification function.”  TPP measures “do 
not impair the communication of the product’s quality, 
characteristics and reputation as regards consistency of 
experience and actual characteristics . . . TPP measures are 
intended precisely to reduce the opportunities to signal artificial 
perceptions and attitudinal characteristics or reputations, which 
Australia characterizes as an ‘advertising function’.”258 
 
Honduras, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic offered three 
differing perspectives on the role of trademarks beyond source 
identification.  Honduras asserted, essentially, that trademarks 
on tobacco products in Australia are not advertisements, and 
that whether trademarks are used for advertising depends on 
context.  Trademarks can be used in advertising, but “that does 
not mean that . . . trademarks are used for advertising in 
Australia because advertising has not been allowed for tobacco 
products in nearly the last 25 years.”259  Interestingly, Cuba 
argued that trademarks on tobacco products in Australia are a 
form of promotion stating that “[t]he manufacturers of prestige 
and luxury goods would not commit very substantial funds to 
marketing and global promotion of their trademarks if they 
would simply serve to identify a producer.”260  The Dominican 
Republic viewed the distinguishing features of trademark as 
placed on a spectrum.261  Each additional feature adds 
distinctive means for consumers to differentiate, and taking 
away each additional feature decreases distinguishing power.262  
Specifically: 
 
The removal of these differentiating features means that the 
relevant quality, characteristics, and reputation are not 
adequately communicated to consumers, as they would be absent 
the TPP measures. . . . [T]he TPP measures have led to 
downtrading from higher- to low-priced tobacco products, which 
shows that the distinctions between brands have weakened, 
consumer loyalty has lessened, and switching between brands has 
                                                          
258 Id. ¶ 7.2565. 
259 Id. ¶ 7.2547. 
260 Id. ¶ 7.2549. 
261 Id. ¶ 7.2552. 
262 Id. 
47
294 Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Law Vol. 32:2 
increased.263 
 
i. Trademark’s ability to distinguish goods 
and services in course of trade versus other 
trademark uses 
The panel began by acknowledging that the effects of TPP 
measures are “far-reaching” insofar as they “eliminate the 
possibility of applying figurative trademarks, or figurative or 
stylized elements of composite and word marks to tobacco retail 
packaging and products, to distinguish the goods of one 
undertaking . . . from those of [an]other.”264  As precedent, the 
panel referenced EC – Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications and noted that, although the case dealt with Article 
17, it “provides useful contextual guidance as regards the 
legitimacy of concerns about constraints on the use of 
trademarks also for purposes of Article 20.”265  The panel in EC 
– Trademarks and Geographical Indications stated: 
 
Every trademark owner has a legitimate interest in preserving the 
distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, of its trademark so that 
it can perform that function. This includes its interest in using its 
own trademark in connection with the relevant goods and services 
of its own and authorized undertakings. Taking account of that 
legitimate interest will also take account of the trademark owner’s 
interest in the economic value of its mark arising from the 
reputation that it enjoys and the quality that it denotes.266 
 
The panel then acknowledged that under Article 20, use in the 
course of trade is not limited to a particular function of 
trademarks.267  In fact, the panel specifically declined conflating 
actual trademark use with different functions, and instead, 
focuses on “the implications of the TPP trademark requirements 
on a trademark’s ability to distinguish goods and services . . .  
and on the ways in which a trademark owner might wish to use 
its trademark in the marketplace, as well as how these 
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requirements affect consumers.”268  It is important to recognize 
the trademark owner’s interest in using the trademark for these 
various purposes,269 and TPP’s impact of TPP on such uses.  
Interestingly, the panel said: “[w]e also recognize that the 
impact of these measures may vary between the different 
purposes for which the right holder may wish to use its 
trademark.”270 
 
As to the purpose of a trademark as identifier of the source 
of the product, “[t]he complainants have not sought to 
demonstrate that consumers have in fact been unable to 
distinguish the commercial source of tobacco products of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings . . . as a result of 
the TPP trademark requirements,”271 as they are still permitted 
to use company, brand, and variant names on retail tobacco 
packaging. 
 
On the essential question of whether trademarks on tobacco 
packaging constitutes advertising and/or promotion, the panel 
concluded that: 
 
[B]randed packaging can act as an advertising or promotion tool 
in relation to tobacco products, and . . . this has . . . been 
considered to be the case by tobacco companies operating in the 
Australian market, even in the presence of significant restrictions 
on advertising [and] . . . particularly . . . in a regulatory context 
such as Australia’s, where all other forms of advertising and 
promotion for tobacco products are prohibited.272 
 
Citing experts, the panel recognized that “a key purpose of the 
use of branding on tobacco products, including packaging, is to 
generate certain positive perceptions in relation to the product 
in the eyes of the consumer.”273  To quote one expert report 
submitted by the complainants, “trademarked packaging is the 
only remaining communication vehicle for cigarette 
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manufacturers in Australia, where advertising and promotional 
opportunities have been progressively reduced.”274  However, 
Australia advances that the very purpose of the TPP measures 
is “to prevent such design features from creating positive 
product perceptions and thus to discourage the use of tobacco 
products by consumers.”275  This debate over the permissibility 
of trademark usage beyond product source identification and 
extending to product advertisement and/or promotion is at the 
core of this issue. 
 
The panel acknowledged the impact of TPP on the use and 
value of creating and maintaining brand differentiation in a few 
significant ways.  One expert noted that “the benefits that a 
strong brand provides to the firm  . . . include greater customer 
loyalty, higher margins and ease of international expansion.”276  
Additionally, the value of a strong brand is especially high for a 
product like cigarettes since brands are key sources of 
differentiation among otherwise largely similar products.277  The 
panel noted that 
 
[B]y disallowing the use of design features of trademarks, the TPP 
measures prevent a trademark owner from using such features to 
convey any messages about the product . . . and deriving any 
economic value from the use of such features. Therefore, the TPP 
measures prevent a trademark owner from extracting economic 
value from any design features of its trademark through its use in 
the course of trade.278 
 
But despite that powerful acknowledgment, the panel decided 
this issue in Australia’s favor.  In doing so, it ultimately rested 
its rationale on two points: (i) “[t]he practical implications of 
those prohibitions are partly mitigated by the fact that the TPP 
measures allow tobacco manufacturers to use word trademarks, 
including brand and variant names, to distinguish their 
products from each other[;]”279 and (ii) there is no evidence that 
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consumers have been unable to distinguish between tobacco 
products.280 
ii. Trademark owner’s ability to extract 
economic value from the use of its 
trademark 
The complainants argued that by restricting the 
opportunity for product differentiation, TPP measures “increase 
price competition and adversely impact in particular premium 
brands.”281  Previously in their opinion, the panel analyzed 
evidence on the impact of reduced differentiation on prices and 
on downward substitution.282  On the issue of price competition, 
empirical evidence submitted by both Australia and the 
complainants showed that the net of taxes price of tobacco 
products has increased since the introduction of the TPP 
measures, with higher-priced brands maintaining their pricing 
premiums.283  Moreover, in the period from Q4 2009 to Q3 2013, 
even though tobacco product consumption decreased, the total 
value of the retail market increased.284  The panel concluded: 
 
Overall, the empirical evidence before us relating to cigarette 
prices, to the total value of the retail market and to the total value 
and volume of cigarette imports does not validate the 
complainants’ argument that the TPP measures will lead to an 
increase in price competition and a fall in prices, and consequently 
to a decrease in the sales value of tobacco products and the total 
value of imports.285 
 
Lastly, although the panel found some limited evidence that the 
TPP measures appear to have had a negative impact on the ratio 
of higher- to low-priced cigarette wholesale sales, the panel was 
“not persuaded . . . that this decrease in the consumption and 
imports of premium tobacco products is exclusively the result of 
‘downtrading’ . . . i.e. a transfer of consumption/imports from 
premium to non-premium products.”286 
                                                          
280 Id. 
281 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2571. 
282 Id.  
283 Id. ¶ 7.2572. 
284 Id.  
285 Id. 
286 Id. ¶ 7.2573. 
51
298 Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Law Vol. 32:2 
ii. Reasons for which the special requirements are applied, 
including any societal interests they are intended to safeguard 
Australia provided extensive evidence for the reasons it 
undertook TPP measures. It cited WHO statistics that “[t]obacco 
use is responsible for the deaths of nearly 6,000,000 people 
annually, including 600,000 non-smokers exposed to second-
hand smoke.”287  It pointed out that there is no safe level of 
tobacco usage—tobacco use harms nearly every organ in the 
body; nicotine is highly addictive; cigarettes are particularly 
effective in delivering nicotine; tobacco is a unique, highly 
addictive, and deadly product; and tobacco is “the only legal 
consumer product that kills half of its long-term users when 
used exactly as intended by the manufacturer.”288 Importantly, 
Australia noted that “[t]his decision was made in the context of 
the comprehensive range of Australian tobacco control 
measures, including advertising and promotional bans, excise 
measures, graphic health warnings, and investment in anti-
smoking initiatives,”289 a point the panel reiterated in its 
decision.290  None of the complainants disputed whether smoking 
is dangerous,291 and Honduras claimed that the dispute “is not 
about whether smoking is dangerous or whether it affects the 
health of many people in Australia and around the world—it is 
and it does.”292  (The other three complainants also espoused the 
importance of public health).293  Rather, “[i]n Honduras’ view, 
‘[t]he issue before the panel is whether the simple invocation of 
the protection of public health, without more, provides a 
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The panel determined that the reasons supporting 
Australia’s passage and implementation of TPP measures are to 
improve public health by reducing the use of and exposure to 
tobacco products.  These measures are part of a larger strategic 
plan involving “advertising and promotional bans, excise taxes, 
GWHs [graphic health warnings] and investments in anti-
smoking initiatives.”295  As noted above, the parties agreed about 
the priority of public health and the importance of effective 
tobacco control measures.296  The panel also pointed to WTO 
members’ emphasis on the importance of public health as a 
legitimate policy concern under paragraph 4 of the Doha 
Declaration.297 
ii. Whether these reasons provide sufficient support for the 
resulting encumbrance 
To begin answering this central question, the panel noted 
that it must first “assess the public health concerns that underlie 
the TPP trademark requirements against their implications on 
the use of trademarks in the course of trade, taking into account 
the nature and extent of the encumbrances at issue.”298 
 
The parties did not dispute that the grounds on which the 
special requirements are applied under TPP address an 
“exceptionally grave domestic and global health problem 
involving a high level of preventable morbidity and mortality.”299  
These special requirements, in conjunction with the overall TPP 
and tobacco-control measures, “are capable of contributing, and 
do in fact contribute, to Australia’s objective of improving public 
health by reducing the use of, and exposure to, tobacco 
products.”300  In the panel’s view, this suggested that the reasons 
for the application of the trademark requirements provided 
sufficient support for the resulting encumbrances and that TPP 
measures are not applied unjustifiably in this case.301  The 
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removal of design features on cigarette packaging “is apt to 
reduce the appeal of tobacco products and increase the 
effectiveness of GHWs [graphic health warnings].  It is integral 
to this approach that the use of certain figurative features and 
signs . . . is restricted as part of the overall standardization of 
retail packaging”302 and “the uniformity of these features is also 
an integral part of the approach underlying the TPP 
measures.”303  The panel next noted that: 
 
[T]he importance of the public health reasons for which the 
trademark-related special requirements under the TPP measures 
are applied is further underscored by the fact that Australia 
pursues its domestic public health objective in line with its 
commitments under the FCTC, which “was developed in response 
to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic” and has been ratified 
by 180 countries.304 
 
The panel rejected the complainants’ proposal to analyze 
alternative measures.305  Complainants suggested alternative 
measures, but the panel concluded that they had not shown that 
any of the proposed alternatives would be better in contributing 
to Australia’s public health objective or that proposed 
alternatives call into question the sufficiency of the reasons 
Australia advanced in support of its TPP restrictions.306  In 
particular, “[the panel] observed that any pre-vetting 
mechanism would involve the introduction of administrative 
discretion and the possibility of permitting tobacco packaging 
elements that would have impacts that are contrary to the TPP 
measures’ objective.”307 
 
On the issue of the need for examination of alternative 
measures, the panel carefully laid out a middle ground.  On one 
hand, it provided some scope of policy making flexibility and 
control widely recognized as fundamental for a sovereign state.  
The panel interpreted the term “unjustifiably” in Article 20 to 
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provide “a degree of latitude to a Member to choose an 
intervention to address a policy objective, which may . . . 
impact . . . the use of trademarks in the course of trade, as long 
as the reasons sufficiently support any resulting 
encumbrance.”308  However, the panel also noted that inquiry of 
alternative measures is in fact relevant to the issue of 
justifiability.  The panel stated that it is: 
 
[N]ot exclud[ing] the possibility that the availability of an 
alternative measure could, in . . . a particular case, call into 
question the reasons a respondent would have given for the 
adoption of a measure challenged under Article 20. This might be 
the case . . . if a readily available alternative would lead to at least 
equivalent outcomes in terms of the policy objective of the 
challenged measure, thus calling into question whether the stated 
reasons sufficiently support any encumbrances on the use of 
trademarks resulting from the measure.309 
 
To conclude, the panel acknowledged that trademarks have 
substantial economic value and that special requirements are 
far-reaching in terms of trademark owners’ opportunities to 
extract economic value from the use of figurative or stylized 
trademark features.310 In light of that recognition, the panel’s 
rationales for concluding that TPP measures are not an 
unjustifiable encumbrance on special trademark requirements 
in the course of trade, and therefore not a violation of Article 
20,311 consist of the following: first,  the gravity of the tobacco 
control issue is an “exceptionally grave domestic and global 
health problem,”312 a point that was both uncontested and amply 
supported; second, there is demonstrative value of the TPP 
measures insofar as, in conjunction with the rest of Australia’s 
tobacco control plan, the measures have helped fulfill public 
health objectives;313 third, TPP is an integral part of 
comprehensive tobacco control policies;314 fourth, Australia has 
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314 Id. ¶ 7.2604. 
55
302 Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Law Vol. 32:2 
pursued its public health objectives in line with emerging 
multilateral public health policies as reflected by FCTC;315 fifth, 
the panel rejected complainants’ argument that individual 
trademark features must be individually assessed under Article 
20;316 and sixth, the panel rejected complainants’ argument that 
alternative measures preclude a finding of justifiability and that 
a pre-vetting mechanism should have been introduced.317 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER EXPLORATION 
On July 19, 2018, Honduras appealed the Panel Report to 
the Appellate Body.318  As of this writing, no announcement has 
been made regarding the expected timing of the Appellate Body’s 
forthcoming report.  In the meantime, there are several lessons 
to glean from the Panel Report decision and the progress of the 
case so far.  First, the importance of this case—its outcome, the 
panel’s rationale, and legal and business implications—is hard 
to overstate.  According to Professor Daniel Gervais of 
Vanderbilt Law School, who was interviewed for a 2013 Forbes 
article, “[t]his is the ‘first TRIPS debate on the intersection 
between trademarks and health . . . [and] [i]t’s a huge precedent 
to set no matter how you cut it.”319  Based on the panel report in 
the case so far, here are some preliminary conclusions and 
potential legal and business implications. 
A. Legal Conclusions and Implications 
1. New guidance on important legal issues 
In its report, the panel articulated a number of legal 
principles which, if upheld by the Appellate Body, will provide 
important guidance in future cases involving challenges 
                                                          
315 Id. ¶ 7.2504. 
316 Id. ¶ 7.2603. 
317 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2603. 
318 Honduras files appeal against WTO panel ruling on tobacco plain 
packaging requirements, WORLD TRADE ORG., (July 19, 2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ds435apl_19jul18_e.htm.  
319 Daniel Fisher, Will Australia’s Gruesome Cigarette Warnings Show Up 
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involving TRIPS Article 20 and other TRIPS provisions.  The 
following are of particular note. 
a. Burden of Proof for justifiability element 
Not surprisingly, the panel stated that “it is for the 
complainants to present a prima facie case that the TPP 
measures amount to special requirements and that the use of a 
trademark in the course of trade is unjustifiably encumbered by 
these requirements.”320  Of note is the panel’s rejection of the 
complainants’ claim to the contrary in deciding that the burden 
of proof rested with the complainants for the element of 
justifiability. 
b. per se unjustifiable 
Also significant is the panel’s opinion regarding 
complainants’ claims that Australia’s TPP measures are per se 
unjustifiable.  First, the extreme nature of the encumbrance’s 
restrictiveness is not, in and of itself, enough to render the 
encumbrance per se unjustifiable.321  However, the fact that 
Australia could advance any rational connection at all to support 
TPP measures is not sufficient to eliminate an inquiry on per se 
unjustifiability.  Even where the rational connection exists, the 
panel must still inquire as to whether the special requirements 
that encumber the trademark in the course of trade are per se 
unjustifiable.322  Second, and perhaps most critically, the panel 
rejected complainants’ argument that Australia should have 
separately considered each individual design feature of a 
trademark, such as typeface, size, and color.323  An opposing 
decision on this point could have been insurmountable for 
Australia.  The panel determined that “Article 20 does not 
require the unjustifiability of special requirements . . . to be in 
all cases assessed by a Member in respect of individual 
trademarks and their specific features.”324  Third, although the 
panel stated that the way in which measures are domestically 
designed and adopted can inform the assessment of 
                                                          
320 Australia Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 7.2169. 
321 Id. ¶ 7.2441. 
322 Id.  
323 Id. ¶ 7.2462. 
324 Id. ¶ 7.2505. 
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unjustifiability of specific special requirements, it also stated 
that Article 20: 
 
[D]oes not impose any specific independent obligation on Members 
as to how they should design their domestic legislative procedures 
or how those procedures should operate. A Member’s compliance 
with its own domestic regulatory procedures does not, in itself, 
determine whether a Member has complied with its obligations 
under Article 20.325 
 
This respects Members’ sovereign decision-making processes 
and policy development, yet it also recognizes that adherence to 
domestic rules cannot serve as a thinly-veiled bad faith 
argument.  Last, the language of TRIPS Article 20 incorporates 
examples of special requirements, not examples of 
encumbrances that are unjustifiable.326 
c. test for justifiability 
The formulation of a test for justifiability was the key issue 
in the Article 20 portion of the panel’s decision, and arguably the 
most important legal question resolved in the entire 888 page 
panel report.  Writing prior to the panel decision, Professor 
Mitchell stated, “[t]he concept of ‘justifiability’ under Article 20 
is ambiguous and has not been considered in any WTO 
jurisprudence.”327  Although Dispute Panels and the Appellate 
Bodies have considered the meaning of “unjustifiable” in other 
contexts, no prior report or decision has considered the meaning 
of “unjustifiable” in the context of Article 20.328  The panel 
articulated that these factors to consider in the determination of 
whether the special requirements that encumber trademarks 
violate Article 20: (a) nature and extent of the encumbrance; (b) 
reasons for the special requirement; and (c) whether the reasons 
provide sufficient support for the encumbrance.329 
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d. Whether the Panel must consider alternative measures 
Should alternative measures that could have been deployed 
be considered?  Does it matter whether alternative measures 
could have made an equivalent contribution while imposing less 
or no encumbrance?  While providing “a degree of latitude to a 
Member to choose an intervention to address a policy 
objective . . . as long as the reasons sufficiently support any 
resulting encumbrance[,]”330 the panel also noted that inquiry of 
alternative measures is in fact relevant to the issue of 
justifiability.331  Interestingly, the panel appeared to be deciding 
that the relevance of alternative measures would help preclude 
questionable or bad faith claims of justifiability, stating that 
“the availability of an alternative measure could, in . . . a 
particular case, call into question the reasons a respondent 
would have given for the adoption of a measure challenged under 
Article 20.”332 
2. Critical nature of justifiability element 
While legal analysis can hardly be reduced to a scorecard, it 
is worthwhile to note that of the five Article 20 elements the 
panel identified (special requirements, encumbrance, course of 
trade, use of trademark and unjustifiably), Australia “lost” 
four.333  And yet, the panel decided that Australia was not in 
violation of Article 20 in enacting TPP measures.  One 
implication is just how much of the case turned on issue of 
proving justifiability of trademark special requirements. 
3. Do Australia’s TPP measures work? Is the measures’ 
effectiveness relevant to the question of justifiability? 
There is good news on this front.  At least to some extent, 
TPP measures work.  As mentioned, the law became effective 
December 1, 2012.  According to the Government of Australia’s 
Post-Implementation Review of Plain Packaging 2016 [PIR]: 
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332 Id. 
333 Id. ¶¶ 7.2145, 7.2146. 
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The major relevant datasets all show drops in national prevalence 
rates since 2012. For example, data from Roy Morgan Research, 
the [Australian Bureau of Statistics] and [Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare] relating to tobacco prevalence, as well as data 
relating to tobacco excise and duty clearances, and household 
expenditure, all show continuing declines in recent years. Dr[.] 
[Tasneem] Chipty’s modelling also estimated a 0.55 percentage 
point drop in smoking prevalence in Australia, over 34 months 
following implementation, attributable to the 2012 packaging 
changes. This strong result, that is “likely understated”, is 
expected to grow into the future as the full effects of the 2012 
packaging changes are reali[z]ed over the longer term.334 
 
According to the WHO, the referenced .55% fall in smoking 
equates to more than 108,000 people quitting, not relapsing or 
not starting to smoke during that period.335  The PIR concluded 
that “[i]n light of all of the above, it is the conclusion of this PIR 
that the measure has begun to achieve its public health 
objectives of reducing smoking and exposure to tobacco smoke in 
Australia and it is expected to continue to do so into the 
future.”336 
 
Some have argued, prior to the release of the panel decision, 
that the strength of evidence as to whether and the extent to 
which plain packaging effectively reduces tobacco consumption 
is “likely to be central to the interpretation of what amounts to 
an unjustified encumbrance under TRIPS Agreement Article 
20.”337  While perhaps not “central,” the panel report does note 
that TPP measures “are capable of contributing, and do in fact 
contribute, to Australia’s objective of improving public health by 
reducing use of, and exposure to, tobacco products.”338  In the 
panel’s view, this suggested that the reasons for the application 
of the trademark requirements provide sufficient support for the 
resulting encumbrances.339 
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While proof of the effectiveness of plain packaging could 
justify the encumbrance resulting from special trademark 
requirements, proof that it does not work should not require a 
finding that the encumbrance is not justified.  Requiring 
governments to prove the efficacy of yet-to-be-implemented or 
newly-implemented policy measures to show justification of 
special requirements would be crippling.  This could result in 
less innovation, greater burden, and more restraint and 
hesitancy in undertaking policy-making initiatives.  
Governments cannot always accurately predict outcomes before 
launching a new initiative, especially when being the first 
country to do so.  Thus, governments should not be required to 
successfully fulfill their objectives.  Moreover, efficacy can be 
difficult or impossible to measure.  Some markers of success 
cannot be proven because they cannot be known.  Who knows 
whether tobacco sellers would have engaged in new, 
sophisticated marketing that would have increased tobacco 
usage but for TPP measures?  More importantly, such an 
approach would burden the policymaking that is the 
responsibility of sovereign governments, particularly as regards 
critical issues like public health.  In short, efficacy of the special 
requirements is relevant to an analysis of justification, but proof 
of success should not be essential. 
B. Slippery slope? 
Some have warned that regulation similar to Australia’s 
TPP measures could apply to a number of consumer products 
such as alcohol, or fatty, sugary or salty foods.  The case has even 
spawned alarmist claims that “global-warming regulators could 
decide gasoline refiners are encouraging excessive driving with 
their ads”340 and musings aloud as to “whether Bloombergian 
anti-obesity crusaders, say, could require pictures of diabetes-
ravaged feet on cans of soda or morbidly obese patients on bags 
of potato chips.”341  Which product(s) could be next?  Could plain 
packaging and similar advertising restrictions be extended to 
non-food products which could cause harm if misused, such as 
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61
308 Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Law Vol. 32:2 
pharmaceuticals or insecticide or construction equipment? 
 
A full analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but the 
panel report in the Australia trademarks case informs the 
inquiry, frames relevant questions and enables some general 
predictions.  Obviously, any Article 20 evaluation of trademark 
special requirements depends on the specific encumbrance and 
circumstances.  Without this information, no one can answer 
questions about which consumer product packaging policy-
making and rules can successfully be defended in an Article 20 
challenge.  However, here are a few general observations. 
 
The panel in the case focused in large part on the following 
three points.  Application of these to other unhealthy food 
products can help evaluate how close a similar trademark 
restriction scheme would map to the TPP Article 20 challenge. 
 
First, they focused on the tobacco control issue, stating that 
it is an “exceptionally grave domestic and global health 
problem,”342 a point that was both uncontested and amply 
supported.  Alcohol is also a serious problem worldwide.  
Globally, there were about 3.3 million deaths in 2012 (5.9% of all 
global deaths) attributable to alcohol consumption.343  Of course, 
there are numerous severe social and economic consequences 
beyond this.344  Unhealthy foods such as sugary and salty 
foods345 contribute to rising obesity levels,346 which in turn cause 
a host of health and related problems.  The similarities and 
differences of the medical and health effects of these products as 
compared to tobacco usage would be an important consideration. 
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343 WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 
2014 vii (2014). 
344 See generally id. 11–16 (discussing major disease and injury categories 
causally impacted by alcohol consumption). 
345 See, e.g., Public health takes aim at sugar and salt, HARV. SCH. PUB. 
HEALTH NEWS (2009), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/magazine/sugar-
and-salt/ (discussing research at the Harvard School of Public Health and 
elsewhere finding a connection with sugary drinks to an epidemic of obesity in 
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Second, they focused on how TPP is an integral part of 
comprehensive tobacco control policies.347  TPP measures were 
taken as part of a much larger strategy involving many other 
initiatives.  While governments do take measures to control or 
discourage alcohol consumption, such as the imposition of excise 
taxes, it would be important to evaluate how comprehensive the 
measures are, how well enforced they are, etc. Salty, fatty, and 
sugary foods probably have weaker government disincentive 
measures. 
 
Third, they focused on how, in part, Australia pursued its 
public health objectives in line with emerging multilateral 
public health policies, especially FCTC.348  The panel stated that 
in part, the strength of Australia’s justifiability claim is that it 
clearly was adopting TPP measures to give effect to its 
obligations under FCTC.349  There is no international convention 
as yet for control of alcohol consumption, although a Framework 
Convention on Alcohol Control, similar to the FCTC, has 
periodically been suggested350 and the WHO in 2010 released a 
Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol.351  No 
country, therefore, could argue that alcohol packaging 
legislation gives effect to worldwide convention obligations 
similar to the FCTC.  While the WHO has studied the effects of 
marketing sugary, fatty, and salty foods, especially on 
children,352 like alcohol, there is no sweeping international 
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convention on this subject, either. 
 
There are other aspects of the inherent nature of tobacco 
and tobacco control that factor into the comparisons with 
unhealthy foods and alcohol.  Tobacco’s inherent characteristics 
distinguish it from these other products in some important ways.  
For example, as Australia claimed in the case, tobacco is a 
“uniquely hazardous product” because it is “the only lawful 
consumer product that kills its users when used as intended”353 
by the manufacturer, and because “[t]here is no safe level of 
tobacco use or safe level of exposure to second-hand or 
environmental tobacco smoke.”354  The same cannot be said of 
alcohol or sugary, fatty or salty foods which, if consumed in 
moderation, are not dangerous to the majority of the population.  
Also, the addictive properties of these products are a significant 
factor.  Alcohol is addictive, and the extent to which unhealthy 
foods are addictive will be an important factor. 
 
The marketing, advertising, and promotion of these various 
products also differs from tobacco in some significant and 
relevant ways.  From a logistical perspective, control on tobacco 
packaging is much easier and more effective than analogous 
control measures would be for sugary, fatty or salty foods.  
Cigarettes are a single product, even though there are 
classifications for flavored tobacco, etc. This makes it much 
easier to identify and control the product, its packaging, and its 
distribution.  Sugar, in contrast, comes in many more forms, it 
can be processed into a huge variety of foods and consequently, 
packaging measures similar to TPP would be far more difficult 
to craft and enforce.  How, for example, could a country enact a 
plain packaging-type statute that would cover sugary foods?  
Would all foods above a certain sugar content level be required 
to be packaged in drab labelling, devoid of logos and other design 
trademarks?  In Australia, one reason TPP measures were 
effective is that virtually all other forms of advertising and 
promotion for tobacco products are prohibited.  There would be 
little incentive to initiate plain packaging measures when there 
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are several other outlets for advertising, branding and 
messaging, which would result in limited effectiveness of any 
such measure. 
C. Other implications for tobacco/smoking industry 
Tobacco companies are turning their attention to less 
developed countries as a result of declining smoking rates in 
more developed countries.355  Further, Australia’s PIR found a 
correlation between TPP measures and decreased tobacco use.356  
Therefore, it could be argued that TPP measures have, in part, 
caused tobacco companies to seek and exploit markets in less 
developed countries.  These countries may have weaker public 
health systems and infrastructure, insufficient medical care 
availability, fewer resources to devote to anti-smoking public 
education campaigns, and other pressing competing policy 
priorities. 
 
That is not all. The tobacco industry is determined to fight 
the case: “[b]ig tobacco has commissioned research that 
contradicts the findings of the [Australian PIR] and is funding 
the Dominican Republic’s legal challenge to plain packaging at 
the World Trade Organisation.”357 Individual companies, of 
course, cannot take a case directly to the WTO.  Should they be 
able to use a country as, essentially, a front for the legal 
challenge? 
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Since Australia’s implementation of TPP measures, several 
others have followed or are considering similar legislation.  
Australia, France, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and 
Norway were the first five countries to implement plain 
packaging measures, all by July 2018.358  As of this writing, 
Ireland, Thailand, Uruguay, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Turkey, 
Israel, and Canada have also passed and implemented plain 
packaging legislation.359  Singapore, Belgium and Hungary have 
enacted plain packaging legislation that is due to take effect 
soon.360 
 
In conclusion, the drafters of the TRIPS Agreement 
intended balance “between the existence of a legitimate interest 
of trademark owners in using their trademarks in the 
marketplace, and the right of WTO Members to adopt measures 
for the protection of certain societal interests that may adversely 
affect such use, including for public health reasons.”361  The 
panel was in unqualified agreement with complainants that TPP 
provisions relating to figurative/stylized elements of trademarks 
are “far-reaching”362 and “prevent a trademark owner from 
extracting economic value from any design features of its 
trademark.”363  According to Philip Morris International’s 
counsel in charge of regulatory policy, PMI “built enormous 
value around those trademarks in full compliance with the law 
and with the full blessing of the government . . . . Now the 
government can take away such property without any decent 
explanation, without looking at the circumstances, without even 
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paying.”364  Clashing with these interests, the WHO asserts that 
tobacco-related illnesses are some of the biggest public health 
threats in the history of the world.365  In this case, the panel 
found that TPP measures did not unjustifiably encumber 
trademarks, prioritizing public health over branding.  It remains 
to be seen whether the Appellate Body will agree. 
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